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These guidelines represent the culmination of efforts, initiated by President Carter in April 1977, 
to review procedures and criteria used by Federal Agencies involved in the design, construction, 
operation, and regulation of dams and to prepare guidelines for management procedures to 
ensure dam safety. The guidelines are based on an intensive review of Agency practices 
conducted by the Departments and Agencies themselves, by an ad hoc interagency committee of 
the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET), and by 
an Independent Review Panel of recognized experts from the academic and private sectors. 
These reviews are summarized in two earlier reports: Improving Federal Dam Safety, a report of 
the FCCSET, November 1977, and Federal Dam Safety Report of the OSTP Independent Review 
Panel, December 1978. 
Publication of the guidelines marks the final step in the review process. However, the 
Departments and Agencies recognize that there must be a continuing Federal effort to improve 
dam safety.  Federal dam safety remains a fundamental responsibility of each Federal employee 
in every Department and Agency involved and it is on their technical expertise and dedication 
that the safety of Federal dams rests. These guidelines recognize that underlying fact and support 
management efforts to discharge that responsibility effectively and efficiently. 
These guidelines apply to Federal practices for dams with a direct Federal interest and are not 
intended to supplant or otherwise conflict with State or local government responsibilities for 
safety of dams under their jurisdiction. Current Federal initiatives to assist States and others with 
non-Federal dam safety programs are being pursued under other authorities. The objective of 
both programs, however, is the same: to allow the people of this country to enjoy the benefits of 
water resource development with the best assurance of dam safety possible. 
The members of the FCCSET Ad Hoc Committee are to be commended for their diligent and 
highly professional efforts. Gratitude and appreciation are also due the several Departments and 
Agencies involved for their whole-hearted interest and support. 
Frank Press, Chairman 
Federal Coordinating Council 
for Science, Engineering and 
Technology TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  1

A .  B A C K G R O U N D  1

B.  AUTHORITY  AND  IMPLEMENTATION  2 

C .  D E F I N I T I O N S  4

II.  OBJECTIVES  AND  SCOPE  7 

III.  GUIDELINES  9

A.  ORGANIZATION  MANAGEMENT  9 

1 .  G e n e r a l  9

a .  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  9

b.  Design  Responsibility  10 

c.  Construction  Responsibility  10 

d.  Operation  Responsibility  10 

e.  Technical  Coordination  10 

f.  Emergency  Planning  11 

g.  Risk-Based  Analysis  11 

2.  Staffing  11 

a.  Technical  Support  11 

b.  Competence  12 

c.  Continuity  12 

d.  Professional  Advancement  12 

3.  Training  12 

a. I n t e r n a l        1 2

b .  A c a d e m i c        1 4

c .  P r o f e s s i o n a l        1 4

d. New  Technology  14 

4.  Communication  14 

a. Interdisciplinary  14 

b.  Interagency  15 

5 .  D o c u m e n t a t i o n        1 5

a. Design  Record  16 

b.  Construction  Record  16 

c. Initial Reservoir Filling and Surveillance Record  16 

d. Operation and Maintenance Record  17 

e.  Permanent  Files  17 

6 .  R e v i e w s         1 7

a. Extent 17 

b .  I n t e r n a l        1 7

c .  E x t e r n a l        1 8

7.  Research  and  Development  19 

a. Methods  and  Materials  20 

b.  Risk-Based  Analysis  20 

i TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 
Page 
c.  Interagency  Coordination  20 

8.  Contracts  20 

a .  D o c u m e n t s        2 0

b.  Modifications  20 

9.  Constraints  20 

a. Funding for Organizational Management  21 

b.  Public  Concerns  21 

B. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES- 

SITE INVESTIGATION AND DESIGN (SID)  21 

1.  Hydrology  21 

a. Hazard  Evaluation  21 

b.  Flood  Development  22 

c. Flood Selection for Design (or Evaluation)  22 

d. Hydrologic Design of Reservoir  22 

e. Downstream  Effects  22 

f .  W a r n i n g  S y s t e m s       2 3

2. Earthquake Investigation and Design  23 

a. Investigation  Factors  23 

b.  Selection  of  Design  Earthquakes  23 

c.  Engineering  Seismology  23 

d. Need for Earthquake Analysis  23 

e. Seismic and Geologic Studies  23 

f.  Design  for  Earthquake  Forces  24 

3.  Geotechnics  24 

a. G e n e r a l        2 4

b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems  25 

c. Geotechnical  Design  26 

d.  Foundation  Treatment  26 

e .  I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n       2 7

f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction  27 

g. Reevaluation at Existing Structures  28 

4.  Hydraulic  Appurtenances  28 

a. G e n e r a l        2 8

b.  Design  Flood  Releases  28 

c.  Other  Water  Releases  29 

d. Reservoir  Evacuation  29 

e. Control of Flows during Construction  29 

f. Design Criteria and Guidance  29 

g. Reanalysis Because of Changes  29 

h. Hydraulic Design Involvement during Life of Structure  29 

5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dam  30 

a. Site  Specific  Design  30 

b .  M a t e r i a l s        3 0

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 
Page 
c.  Design  of  Structures  30 

d.  Definition  of  Loads  30

e.  Design  Methods  31 

f.  Design  Evaluation  31

g.  Instrumentation  31 

h. Construction and Operational Follow-up  31 

6.  Embankment  Dams  31 

a. Site  Specific  Design  31 

b .  M a t e r i a l s        3 2

c. Design  Constructability  32 

d.  Embankment  Design  32 

e .  I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n       3 3

f. Construction and Operational Follow-up  33 

C. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES- 

C O N S T R U C T I O N  ( C O N )        3 4

1.  Introduction  34 

a. Construction  Contracts  34 

b.  Construction/Design  Interface  34 

2.  Evaluation  during  Construction  35 

3. Orientation of Construction Engineers and Field Inspectors  35 

a.  Design  Related  35 

b.  Foundation  36 

c .  M a t e r i a l s        3 6

d. Construction  General  36 

4.  Construction  Assurance  37 

a.  Construction  Procedures  37 

b.  Construction  Materials  Testing  37 

c. Quality  Assurance  37 

D. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES- OPERATION AND 

M A I N T E N A N C E  ( O & M )        3 8

1.  Operation  and  Maintenance  38 

a. G e n e r a l        3 8

b.  Operating  Procedures  38 

c. Maintenance  Procedure  39 

2. Periodic  Inspection  Program  39 

a. G e n e r a l        3 9

b. Types and Frequencies of Inspections  40 

c. I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n       4 2

d. Correction  of  Deficiencies  43 

e .  D o c u m e n t a t i o n       4 4

3.  Emergency  Action  Planning  45 

a. G e n e r a l        4 5

b. Evaluation of Emergency Potential  45 

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 
Page 
c. Actions to Prevent Failure or Minimize Effects of Failure  46 

d. Actions Upon Discovery of a Potentially Unsafe Condition  49 

IV. APPENDICES
A. FCCSET AD  HOC INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE MEMBERS  A-1 

B. INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES SUBCOMMITTEE  MEMBERS  B-1 

C. OCTP INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL  MEMBERS  C-1 

D.  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  D-1 

E .  B I B L I O G R A P H Y          E - 1

iv I. INTRODUCTION 
These guidelines apply to management practices for dam safety of all Federal agencies 
responsible for the planning, design, construction, operation, or regulation of dams. They are not 
intended as guidelines or standards for the technology of dams.  The basic principles of the 
guidelines apply to all dams.  However, reasonable judgments need to be made in their 
application commensurate with each dam’s size, complexity, and hazard. 
The Federal agencies have a good record and generally sound practices on dam safety.  These 
guidelines are intended to promote management control of dam safety and a common approach 
to dam safety practices by all the agencies. Although the guidelines are intended for and 
applicable to all agencies, it is recognized that the methods of the degree of application will vary 
depending on the agency mission and functions. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Throughout history, in all parts of the world, dams built to store water have occasionally failed 
and discharged the stored waters to inflict sometimes incalculable damage in the loss of lives and 
great damage to property.  Failures have involved dams built without application of engineering 
principles, but have also involved dams built to, at the time, accepted engineering standards of 
design and construction. The technology of dams has improved with the increased knowledge of 
design principles and of the characteristics of foundation and dam materials, and it is generally 
agreed that safe dams can be built and existing dams can be safely maintained with proper 
application of current technology.  It is the intent of these guidelines to outline management 
practices that will help to ensure the use of the best current technology in the design, 
construction, and operation of new dams and in the safety evaluation of existing dams.   
As early as 1929, following the failure of the St. Francis Dam, the State of California enacted a 
dam safety program. Subsequently, other dam failures causing loss of life and property have 
prompted additional legislation on state and national levels. 
The Congress in 1972 enacted Public Law 92-367, known as the "National Dam Inspection Act." 
The Secretary of the Army was authorized to inspect non-Federal dams in the nation meeting the 
size and storage limitations of the Act to evaluate their safety; report inspection results to the 
States and advise the States on actions needed to ensure dam safety; report to the Congress the 
information given to the States; prepare a national inventory of dams; and make 
recommendations to the Congress “for a comprehensive national program for the inspection and 
regulation for safety purposes of dams of the nation.”  Responsibilities under the law were 
delegated to the Corps of Engineers.  The activities performed under the program consisted of an 
inventory of dams; a survey of each State and Federal agency's capabilities, practices, and 
regulations regarding the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of dams; development 
of guidelines for inspection and evaluation of dam safety; and formulation of recommendations 
for a comprehensive national program.  A report on these activities and proposed legislation to 
implement a Federal dam safety program were transmitted to Congress in November 1976, but 
lack of funding prevented the execution of the detailed dam inspections. 
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The failure during initial filling in 1976 of the Teton Dam in Idaho, a Federal earth embankment 
dam over 300 feet high, reactivated intense public and governmental concern for dam safety.  
Congressional and Federal agency investigations were made into this disaster and the entire 
question of dam safety, and new Federal legislation for dam safety was initiated in the Congress. 
An April 23, 1977, Presidential memorandum (reproduced in Section I.B) directed federal 
agencies to review their dam safety practices, addressing many elements of dam safety.  Major 
elements included internal and external review, qualifications of personnel, integration of new 
technology, emergency preparedness plans, and review of existing dams.  The agencies’ reviews 
and the assessment of the reviews by a Federal ad hoc interagency committee and by an 
Independent Review Panel showed that sound practices are generally being used, but concluded 
that improvement is needed in some management practices for dam safety. 
B. AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The authority for preparation of these guidelines is contained in a memorandum from President 
Carter dated April 23, 1977, which read as follows: 
“MEMORANDUM FOR: 
The Secretary of the Interior 
The Secretary of Agriculture 
The Secretary of the Army 
The Director, Office of Management and Budget 
The President’s Adviser on Science and Technology 
The Chairman, Federal Power Commission 
The Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority 
The Commissioner, U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission 
The safety of dams has been a principal concern of Federal agencies that are involved with the 
various aspects of their planning, construction, operation and ultimate disposal. Events of the 
past several years have highlighted the need to review procedures and criteria that are being 
employed by these agencies with the objective of ensuring that the most effective mechanisms 
are established to give the best assurance of dam safety possible within the limitations of the 
current state of knowledge available to the scientific and engineering communities. The safety of 
such projects should continue to be accorded highest consideration, and it is the responsibility of 
the head of each agency concerned to ensure the adequacy of his agency's dam safety program. 
I.  Agency Dam Safety Reviews 
The head of each Federal agency responsible for, or involved with site selection, design, 
construction, certification or regulation, inspection, maintenance and operation, repair and 
ultimate disposition of dams shall immediately undertake a thorough review of practices which 
could affect the safety and integrity of these structures. This review will encompass all activities 
which can be controlled or regulated by the agency. 
Several aspects of the problem require special attention.  In particular, the following items should 
be investigated: the means of inclusion of new technological methods into existing structures and 
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procedures; the degree to which probabilistic or risk-based analysis is incorporated into the 
process of site selection, design, construction, and operation; the degree of reliance on in-house, 
interagency, and outside expert interpretation of geologic data in site selection and design 
development; the effect on dam safety of earthquake or other earth movement hazards; the 
effects of cost-saving incentives on decisions both prior to and during construction; the 
procedures by which dam safety problems are identified, analyzed, and solved; the involvement 
of local communities in identifying, analyzing, and solving dam safety questions; and the major 
outstanding dam safety problems of the agency. 
II. Interagency Report and Proposed Guidelines 
The Chairman of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology 
(FCCSET) shall convene an ad hoc interagency committee to coordinate dam safety programs, 
seeking consistency and commonality as appropriate, and providing recommendations as to the 
means of improving the effectiveness of the Government-wide dam safety effort. The agency 
reviews described above should be provided to the FCCSET as a basis for the interagency 
analysis on a timetable established by the FCCSET group as reasonable and consistent with the 
October 1, 1977 deadline for a final report.  Representation on the FCCSET for this activity 
should be expanded to include other appropriate Federal agencies or departments including, but 
not limited to, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the United States Section-International Boundary 
and Water Commission and the Federal Power Commission.  The FCCSET effort will include 
preparation of proposed Federal dam safety guidelines for management procedures to ensure 
dam safety.  FCCSET should report on all these items. 
III. Independent Review Panel 
In addition, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy will arrange for review 
of agency regulations, procedures and practices, and of the proposed federal dam safety 
guidelines, by a panel of recognized experts to be established immediately.  The panel will 
obtain the views and advice of established organizations, professional societies, and others 
concerned with the safety of dams which are in any way affected by a Federal role. 
The review report thereon should be completed no later than October 1, 1978.” 
(signed) Jimmy Carter 
The ad hoc interagency committee called for in paragraph II of the memorandum was established 
by FCCSET, under the direction of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The committee 
was represented by: 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (Chairman) 
Department of the Army 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of the Interior 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (Formerly Federal Power Commission) 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was added to the dam agencies addressed in the 
memorandum.  Members of the ad hoc committee are listed in Appendix A. 
Also established were subcommittees for the preparation of the proposed Federal dam safety 
guidelines called for in paragraph II of the memorandum. These subcommittees and their task 
groups had representatives from all the agencies with responsibilities for dams. Appendix B lists 
the members of the subcommittees and task groups and their agencies. 
In accordance with the Presidential memorandum, the participating agencies submitted their 
reports on review of agency management practices involving dam safety; the subcommittees 
submitted the proposed Federal dam safety guidelines; and the ad hoc committee prepared the 
FCCSET report, Improving Federal Dam Safety, dated November 15, 1977. The report contains 
summaries of the agency reports, and the subcommittee proposed guidelines and summary 
thereof; assesses the agency reports; and makes recommendations for improvement of 
management practices for dam safety. 
Pursuant to paragraph III of the President's memorandum, the Independent Review Panel was 
formed with specialists from the academic and private sectors concerned with dams.  Members 
of the panel are listed in Appendix C.  The panel reviewed the FCCSET and associated reports 
and proposed guidelines, and submitted a report, Federal Dam Safety, Report of the OSTP 
Independent Review Panel, December 6, 1978. 
These guidelines were developed from the FCCSET report and its proposed guidelines, from 
Independent Review Panel recommendations, and with the cooperation of the panel. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply in these guidelines. 
Dam or Project.  Any artificial barrier, including appurtenant works, which impounds or diverts 
water, and which (1) is twenty-five feet or more in height from the natural bed of the stream or 
watercourse measured at the downstream toe of the barrier or from the lowest elevation of the 
outside limit of the barrier if it is not across a stream channel or watercourse, to the maximum 
water storage elevation or (2) has an impounding capacity at maximum water storage elevation 
of fifty acre-feet or more. These guidelines do not apply to any such barrier which is not in 
excess of six feet in height regardless of storage capacity, or which has a storage capacity at 
maximum water storage elevation not in excess of fifteen acre-feet regardless of height. This 
lower size limitation should be waived if there is a potentially significant downstream hazard. 
The guidelines apply with equal force whether the dam has a permanent reservoir or is a 
detention dam for temporary storage of floodwaters. The impounding capacity at maximum 
water storage elevation includes storage of floodwaters above the normal full storage elevation. 
In addition to conventional structures, this definition of "dam" specifically includes "tailings 
dams," embankments built by waste products disposal and retaining a disposal pond. 
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Dam Failure. Catastrophic type of failure characterized by the sudden, rapid, and uncontrolled 
release of impounded water. It is recognized that there are lesser degrees of failure and that any 
malfunction or abnormality outside the design assumptions and parameters which adversely 
affect a dam's primary function of impounding water is properly considered a failure. Such lesser 
degrees of failure can progressively lead to or heighten the risk of a catastrophic failure. They 
are, however, normally amenable to corrective action. 
Contract. Contracts relating to project design, construction equipment, operation, or regulation, 
as applicable to the project and the agency function. Where work is described using the terms 
contract or contractor, it is meant to include also similar work by the agency's own personnel 
Maintenance. Maintaining structures and equipment in intended operating condition; equipment 
repair and minor structure repair. 
Rehabilitation or Improvement. Repair of structure deterioration to restore original condition; 
alteration of structures to improve dam stability, enlarge reservoir capacity, or increase spillway 
and outlet works capacity; replacement of equipment. 
Hazard. Potential loss of life or property damage downstream of a dam from floodwaters 
released at the dam or waters released by partial or complete failure of the dam, and upstream of 
the dam from effects of rim slides. A hazard is considered significant if there is a potential to 
cause loss of life or major damage to permanent structures, utilities, or transportation facilities. 
Emergency Preparedness Plan.  Formal plan of procedures to alleviate hazards during 
construction of or after completion of a dam or to reduce damages if conditions develop in which 
dam failure is likely or unpreventable. These emergency plans related to dam safety do not 
include flood plain management for the controlled release of floodwater for which the project is 
designed. 
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II. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 

The overall purpose of these guidelines is to enhance national dam safety. The immediate 
objective is to encourage high safety standards in the practices and procedures Federal agencies 
use or require of those they regulate for dam site investigation, design, construction, operation 
and maintenance, and emergency preparedness. As these guidelines are directly applied to make 
Federal dams as safe as practical, it is hoped that they will also influence state dam safety 
agencies and public and private dam owners to be more safety conscious where programs are 
now weak. 
The guidelines are intended to outline Federal agency management procedures that will 
continually stimulate technical methods in dam planning, design, construction, and operation for 
minimizing risk of failure. The objective of dam safety would be achieved as management and 
technical decisions during all project stages give proper recognition to safety considerations, and 
the strategy of these guidelines toward that end is to describe definite management practices to 
reinforce decision-maker awareness of safety needs. Those charged with administering these 
guidelines must recognize that the achievement of dam safety is through a continuous, dynamic 
process in which guidelines, practices, and procedures are examined periodically and updated. 
Technical procedures need to change with technological advancement, and management should 
ensure that observed deficient practices are corrected and that successful practices are duplicated. 
The goal of making dams as safe as practical implies a limit to maximum reasonable effort. 
Those charged with implementing these guidelines need to recognize that no dam can ever be 
completely "fail-safe" because of incomplete understanding of or uncertainties associated with 
natural (earthquakes and floods) and manmade (sabotage) destructive forces; with materials 
behavior and response to these forces; and in control of the construction process. Management 
must ensure that uncertainties are properly balanced with competent technical judgment. 
Although dams have been built for thousands of years, dam engineering is not an exact science 
and is more accurately described as an "art." It is true that this branch of engineering, like any 
other, draws heavily upon mathematical principles and physical laws, but every stage of the 
planning and execution of a dam project also requires the exercise of experienced judgment. This 
is true in designing and constructing new dams, and especially true in evaluating and/or 
improving existing dams. For many of these "older dams," there is little information available to 
document original site exploration, design, construction, and past operation. These dams must be 
carefully inspected and observed for indicators of distress. 
To illustrate a principle from just one aspect of dam design, there are practical limitations on the 
amount of physical data that can be obtained during planning and design. Judgment and 
extrapolation are necessary to assess foundation conditions and to design an appropriate 
structure. Experience is essential in applying these judgments. 
Construction is a critical phase in achieving a safe dam. Any project must be continuously 
evaluated, and "re-engineered" as required, during construction to assure that the final design is 
compatible with conditions encountered during construction. Quality of construction is also 
critical to safety. Deficiencies in materials or construction practices can occur during all stages of 
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the construction, and constant vigilance is necessary to prevent them. Sampling and testing at a 
completed project cannot be relied on as an effective substitute for inspection and quality control 
during construction. 
Monitoring existing dams and reacting quickly to inadequate performance or to danger signals is 
a continuing critical aspect for dam safety. Careful monitoring and quick response can prevent 
failures, including those caused by poor construction. 
The guidelines are intended to make as small as possible the failure risk inherent in constructing 
new dams, and to prioritize needs to improve existing dams according to hazard potential as 
estimated by technical analysis and as constrained by financial and personnel resources. 
In the development of these guidelines, consideration was given to the broad diversity of agency 
missions. The guidelines were designed to be free of specific agency policies and unnecessary 
details. The resultant level of detail in the guidelines represents an attempt to achieve a balance 
between general management goals for assuring dam safety and meaningful principles which can 
survive technological changes and be useful to the non-Federal community. 
A special situation exists regarding the application of these guidelines to dams of international 
nature. Several dams of concern to the United States are located partially in the United States and 
partially in Mexico or Canada. Those dams located at the U.S.-Mexican border are only partly 
subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Federal agency, the U.S. Section of the International 
Boundary and Water Commission. In this case, the U.S. should seek agreement with the Mexican 
Section of the Commission for adoption of applicable sections of these guidelines for ensuring 
dam safety. For dams located on the U.S.-Canadian border, the guidelines should be referred to 
the U.S. Section of the International Joint Commission (IJC) to seek agreement with the 
Canadian Section of the Commission on means by which the guidelines could be implemented 
through the entities that are responsible for construction, operation, and maintenance of the 
projects. 
Section III.A., Organization Management, outlines the elements of agency management respon 
sibilities for dam safety. Sections III.B, III.C, and III.D, Management of Technical Activities, 
contain additional guidance on technical activities for Site Investigation and Design, 
Construction, and Operation and Maintenance (includes Periodic Inspection Program and 
Emergency Action Planning). Appendix E is a bibliography of references to related guidelines 
and practices developed by Federal dam building agencies and other scientific and technical 
organizations. The body of knowledge represented by the bibliography is intended to be 
representative of dam technology, but not inclusive of all available literature that may be helpful. 
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III. GUIDELINES 
A. ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 
1. General 
Heads of Federal agencies are responsible for the development and implementation of policy, 
resources and procedures for safe design, construction, operation, and inspection of each dam 
under their jurisdiction, as applicable to the agency mission. The agency management structure 
assists the head of the agency in discharging this responsibility and shares in it. The management 
structure is ultimately responsible for obtaining compliance with the intent of these management 
and technical activities guidelines, and for assuring that procedures are evaluated and updated 
periodically. 
a. Administration 
The head of each Federal agency having responsibility for design, construction, operation, or 
regulation of dams should establish a dam safety office (officer) which reports directly to the 
head of the agency or his designated representative. The office should be responsible for 
ensuring that the agency, as a matter of policy and in actual practice, makes every reasonable and 
prudent effort to enhance the safety of the dams under its jurisdiction. Duties of the office should 
include surveillance and evaluation of the agency's administrative and technical or regulatory 
practices related to dam safety concerning design and construction of new dams, and operation, 
maintenance and rehabilitation of existing dams; recommending improvements in the practices 
when evaluation reveals safety-related deficiencies; and maintaining an inventory of agency 
dams. 
The functions of the office should be advisory to the agency head, and through the agency head 
to the agency administrative and technical units. The staffing and detailed duties of the office 
should be commensurate with the agency mission. 
If a Federal dam safety office is established within the recently proposed Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the heads of the dam safety offices in the respective agencies 
should be advisory in FEMA's interagency coordinating functions. 
The agency organization for the design, construction, operation, or regulation of a dam project 
should be structured so that a single identifiable, technically qualified administrative head has the 
responsibility for assuring that all management and technical safety aspects of dam engineering 
are adequately considered throughout the development and operation of the project. The position 
must have continuity of guidance and direction, and the authority and resources to ensure these 
responsibilities can be carried out. 
Management should ensure that organization staffing is sufficient and qualified for the projected 
workload, and that all programs necessary for the safety of dams are established, continued, and 
realistically funded. Allocation of manpower and funds should give high priority to safety-
related functions. Safety-related functions and features must not be sacrificed to reduce costs, 
improve project justification, or expedite time schedules. 
9 
b. Design Responsibility
The design function can never be considered finished as long as the dam remains in place; design 
involvement should continue throughout construction and operation of the project. The design 
office should establish specific programs for onsite construction and operational inspection for 
review by appropriate design personnel and technical specialists. The programs should include 
frequent and mandatory inspections during construction to confirm that site conditions conform 
to those assumed for design or to determine if design changes may be required to suit the actual 
conditions. A major requirement is inspection and approval of the dam foundation and 
foundation treatment before placing of dam materials. Final design inspection of the construction 
should include complete project surveillance and testing of operating equipment. Operational 
design inspections should continue throughout the life of the project, in accordance with a formal 
inspection program covering all project features. Management must program adequate funds to 
assure dam safety is not compromised by failure to conduct regular and thorough inspections and 
reviews. 
The design function includes responsibility for planning any dam instrumentation to be installed 
during construction and/or operation to monitor conditions that could potentially threaten dam 
safety. The design should identify the purpose of the instrumentation, and include the plans for 
timely reading, collecting, reducing, and interpreting the data. It should include an advance 
determination of critical instrument observations or rates of data change, and a plan of action if 
observations indicate a critical condition may occur. 
c. Construction Responsibility 
The responsibility for administering construction and supply contracts, for understanding the 
design and contract intent, for maintaining technical coordination between design and 
construction engineers, and for managing the construction staff to assure compliance with 
specifications should be vested in an identified engineer at the construction project. He should 
have the administrative and technical control of all resources necessary to accomplish safe 
construction of the dam. Construction personnel should understand the conditions upon which 
the design is based and the relationship between these conditions and the design features. When 
unanticipated conditions are encountered, design personnel should be involved in determining 
their effect. 
d. Operation Responsibility 
The responsibility for project operation should be assigned to a single staff member of the 
operating organization. He should also handle the operating organization requirements for 
coordination with the design organization, including reporting changed conditions discovered by 
operators and participation of the operating organization personnel with design personnel in the 
periodic inspection program. 
e. Technical Coordination 
All technical specialties required to plan, design, construct, and operate dams to achieve dam 
safety should be staffed and their efforts coordinated to ensure technical adequacy. A project 
design engineer should be assigned technical coordination responsibility for each dam. He 
should handle necessary technical coordination within the agency and with private and public 
organizations. 
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Continuing liaison should be maintained among the personnel concerned with the various stages 
of project development and operation so that each concerned discipline and organizational unit 
knows and understands the relevant activities of the others. This coordination must be given 
constant attention to be sure proper action is taken. 
f. Emergency Planning 
An emergency plan should be formulated for each dam. The plan should be in the detail 
warranted by the size and location of the dam and reservoir. It should evaluate downstream 
inundation hazards resulting from floods or dam failure, and upstream conditions that might 
result from major land displacements or increased flood flows, including the effects from failure 
of upstream dams. 
Where applicable, the plan should include inundation maps for the flows resulting from design 
floods and from possible failure of the dam. The complete emergency plan should be transmitted 
to appropriate local, state, and Federal governmental bodies. The plan should be periodically 
reviewed and kept up to date, and periodically publicized to maintain awareness of its existence. 
In addition to the emergency plan for the completed dam, a similar plan should be prepared for 
the construction period, including area facilities that may remain during the period and floods 
that may be anticipated. 
g. Risk-Based Analysis 
Risk-based analytical techniques and methodologies are a relatively recent addition to the tools 
available for assessing dam safety. With further refinement and improvement, risk-based 
analyses will probably gain wider acceptance in the engineering profession and realize potential 
as a major aid to decision-making in the interest of public safety. However, even when fully 
developed, risk analyses cannot be used as a substitute for sound professional judgment of 
engineers, contractors, or review boards. In view of the dual problems of uncertainty in analysis 
and possibility of misinterpretation by the public, but in recognition of the high potential these 
techniques have, agencies should be encouraged to conduct research to refine and improve the 
techniques and to develop the methodologies and base of expertise necessary to apply them to 
dam safety evaluations. Specifically, agencies should strive to perfect techniques for evaluating 
the probability of possible deficiencies causing dam failure and estimating the potential losses 
due to such a failure. Meanwhile, the agencies should evaluate the potential consequences of 
failure of the dams under their jurisdiction. Although the value of potential property losses can 
be estimated, it is recognized that potential loss of lives can only be quantified, but not evaluated. 
On new dams, potential losses can be used in study of project alternatives and in assessment of 
additional safety incorporated into the dam facilities. On existing dams, a risk-based analysis 
should be considered in establishing priorities for examining and rehabilitating the dams, or for 
improving their safety. 
2. Staffing 
a. Technical Support 
Management should assure adequate and competent technical staffing to perform the essential 
functions in planning design, construction, and operation and maintenance of dams. Technical 
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staff should be well supported by administrative, clerical, and other elements to ensure that the 
technical staff is not diverted from technical work. In the planning and design function, particular 
emphasis should be given to adequate staffing in hydrology, hydraulics, geology, engineering 
seismology, field investigation, and geotechnical and structural design. Sufficient expertise 
should be available on the construction staff and on the operation staff to maintain an 
understanding of design decisions related to the various design specialties. 
Construction inspection staffing should assure quality as well as quantity inspection coverage. 
Staffing should be reviewed by higher authority than the local construction office. Field 
personnel should be well trained and experienced if the design is to be implemented and a safe 
structure is to be constructed. They must not only recognize the need for adherence to the design, 
but must be able to recognize when the design is at odds with conditions being encountered. The 
responsibility and importance of the construction staff to dam safety must be given appropriate 
consideration in organizational and position classification decisions. 
The operating personnel must be qualified to perform the many functions required in the 
operation, including the recognition of conditions possibly detrimental to dam safety. Operation 
and maintenance staffing requires careful attention to personnel responsible for operating 
inspections, and to personnel who participate in the periodic inspection program. It is essential 
that support personnel and equipment are provided to accomplish needed maintenance activities. 
b. Competence 
Job-related experience, professional aptitudes, and educational background should be major 
factors in evaluating the competence of individuals for the requirements of each responsible 
position concerned with the safe design, construction, and operation of dams. All positions 
should be staffed by competent engineers or specialists in the related disciplines. 
c. Continuity 
Staffing policies should recognize that continuity of technical positions is essential to maintain 
consistent high standards of practice. This applies in all elements of project development from 
design to operation, and is especially critical in those positions having supervisory responsibility 
related to dam safety.  
d. Professional Advancement 
The agencies should maintain a positive program for advancement of technical personnel in 
recognition of acquired experience, training and education, and increased competence. It is 
essential that agencies maintain the technical as well as the managerial expertise required for 
safe, effective dam design, construction, and operating programs. Organizational structure, 
position classification, and career incentives must recognize both technical and managerial 
responsibility and compensate both equitably. 
3. Training 
a. Internal 
To supplement technical staffing, agency management should provide internal personnel 
training. A rotational training program should be established to familiarize new personnel with 
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all major aspects of the agency functions and the interrelationships of its organizational units. 
Provisions should be made for technical personnel to observe and participate in decision-making 
meetings and to make site visits with more experienced staff. Staff members should be allowed 
to attend consultant meetings in order to gain valuable experience. 
Technical personnel concerned with all phases of project development should be given broad 
exposure to a variety of field conditions. For example, geologists and geotechnical personnel 
should gain experience with soil and rock drill crews and in the laboratory testing facilities; 
design personnel should be familiar with concrete and soil placing and testing techniques; 
operating personnel should be familiar with equipment installation and testing procedures. 
A rotational training program should be considered that would place construction engineers in 
the design organization during design and design engineers in the field during construction on 
temporary assignments. Preconstruction training should be provided for inspection personnel, 
covering the design engineering considerations and the requirements and importance of thorough 
field inspection. The training should be given by embankment or structural engineers and 
geologists assigned from design or by the construction engineer who had received 
preconstruction orientation by the designers, geologists, and embankment and structural 
engineers (section III.A.4.a). This training should make sure that all inspectors know the 
expected requirements in detail. Onsite instruction sessions for inspection of new features of 
construction should be developed and given by supervisors or lead inspectors before initiation of 
the work. 
Operation and maintenance personnel should be trained by personnel experienced in operation of 
similar projects, covering all features of facilities operation and inspection. Thorough training 
should be provided for the personnel who will take observations on and monitor any installed 
dam instrumentation. The training should be conducted by experienced observers and by the 
engineers responsible for analyzing the structure effects revealed by the instrumentation data. 
Technically qualified operating personnel should be trained in problem detection and evaluation, 
and application of appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) measures. This is 
essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels of responsibility which, 
initially, must be based on observations made by trained operating personnel at the project. The 
training should cover the problems that experience has shown are most likely to occur with the 
type of dam and facilities, and include the kinds of monitoring best suited to early detection of 
those problems. Such training will permit prompt action when time is a critical factor. A 
sufficient number of personnel should be trained to ensure adequate coverage of all tasks at all 
times. If a dam is operated by remote control, training must include procedures for dispatching 
trained personnel to the site at any reported indication of distress. 
Personnel involved in inspections should be trained for the requirements of these duties. The 
training should cover the types of information needed to prepare for the inspections, critical 
features that should be observed, inspection techniques, and preparation of inspection reports. 
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b. Academic 
Agency management should establish and maintain a program for continuing formal education 
and training aimed at increasing and broadening the agency's base of professional expertise in 
areas related to safe design and construction of dams. Such training should provide for part 
and/or full time attendance at universities and at special courses prepared by technical and 
professional organizations. Programs should be designed to further the development of younger 
personnel and to provide refresher training or sabbaticals for senior personnel. 
Supervisory construction, inspection, and operation and maintenance staff should keep current 
on modern methods and techniques by attending technical courses. Pertinent courses are 
available from private sources and educational institutions. Also, agencies that develop internal 
educational programs for this purpose should make them available to other agencies, permitting 
the agencies to gain mutual benefit in the exchange of information on new methods and 
practices. 
c. Professional 
Professional growth of personnel should be encouraged by policies which ensure adequate 
training, support participation in technical and professional societies, and establish attractive 
career and promotional ladders for technical specialists. Professional registration and active 
membership in professional and technical societies should be given due consideration in 
assessing qualifications for higher technical positions. 
d. New Technology 
Provision should be made for the establishment of procedures to screen and disseminate 
information on technical advances relating to dam design, construction, and operation. Programs 
for continuing professional training should be oriented toward keeping the technical staff abreast 
of improved technology. Interagency coordination on training in new technology should be 
established in areas of mutual interest. 
4. Communication 
Effective methods of communication, coordination, and review should be established and 
functioning properly at all times, and be periodically reviewed and updated. Procedures for 
communications among Federal, State, and local agencies on safety-related matters should be 
established. Specific areas of suggested communication are discussed below. 
a. Interdisciplinary 
Direct and easily accessible means of communication should be established between personnel in 
planning, design, construction, and operations. Coordination is necessary for preparation of the 
site investigation plan and for a common understanding of information needed for design. Prior 
to the site investigation the design staff should arrange for meetings between geologists, 
geotechnical engineers, and designers to review known site conditions, project functional 
requirements, and preliminary design concepts. A visit to the site should be included in the 
review of existing information. 
A document, referred to by some agencies as "Design Considerations," should be prepared by the 
design staff to transmit site-specific design considerations to the construction staff. This 
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document should cover, but not be limited to, hydrologic and hydraulic considerations, geologic 
and geotechnical data, foundation conditions, foundation treatment details, and anticipated 
foundation problems. It should specify points at which inspection and approval are required by 
the design staff. Copies of the document should be furnished to those responsible for dam 
operation and inspection. 
Additionally, the design staff should arrange preconstruction orientation for the construction 
engineers by the designers, geologists, and embankment and structural engineers so that the 
construction engineer and his staff fully understand the design concepts and the significance of 
the results of the exploratory work. The construction engineers need to provide the designers, 
prior to advertising the construction contract, comments on the constructability and the ease of 
contract administration for the plans and specifications. 
During construction, the construction engineers should be alert for conditions that need to be 
reported to the design engineers. Field personnel should notify design personnel of any critical 
construction sequence or of a suspected change in conditions that could affect the design of the 
structure. Design engineers with relevant expertise must be available to make regular visits to the 
construction site, and additional visits as needed when varying conditions arc encountered. 
Changes in construction or materials should be made only after plans for changes are approved 
by design personnel. 
The design staff should furnish to the operation staff documents, referred to by some agencies as 
"Operation and Maintenance Manuals," containing pertinent design and construction information 
on structures and equipment required for effective and safe operation of the dam. A conference 
of design and operating personnel should be held to ensure that the operators understand the 
operating and inspection procedures required for safe and reliable operation. Both the operators 
and the designers should have copies of equipment operating and testing manuals and 
procedures. The operators should notify the designers of any safety-related operating 
malfunctions and the actions taken to correct them. There should be continuing communication 
between operating and design staffs regarding plans and schedules for periodic safety inspections 
of the dam. Copies of operation and maintenance manuals should be furnished to the dam 
inspection staff. 
b. Interagency 
Interagency communications should be maintained on safety matters related to design, 
construction, and operation of dams, and related research. This should include exchange of 
materials such as design standards, construction specifications, significant research reports, and 
final design and construction reports on major structures. The agencies should establish 
communications to periodically review investigation methods, construction materials testing 
standards, analytical methods, design philosophies, and management procedures. 
5. Documentation 
Throughout project development (planning, site investigation, design, construction, initial 
reservoir filling, and operation), all data, computations, and engineering and management 
decisions should be documented. Documentation should cover investigation and design, 
construction plans and construction history, operation and maintenance instructions and history, 
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damage and repairs and improvements, and periodic inspections during construction and 
operation. It should include, but not be limited to, memoranda, engineering reports, criteria, 
computations, drawings, and records of all major decisions pertaining to the safety of the dam. 
a. Design Record 
Written documentation should be maintained in standardized format on all design-related 
information for the project. Planning design documentation should cover the project objectives 
and the studies made to locate, size, classify as to potential hazard, and select the type of dam 
and auxiliary facilities. Site investigation documentation should cover geologic mapping and 
studies made of the geologic and geotechnical explorations and conditions for the various dam 
sites considered and the detailed investigations for the chosen site. Geological, seismological, 
and geotechnical features and considerations, whether specifically identified during the 
investigation, interpretations from the data and experience at other sites, or suspected by 
experienced personnel, should be fully documented. Design documentation should include all 
design criteria, data and qualitative information, assumptions, analyses and computations, studies 
on discarded alternatives, and derived judgments and decisions. 
As-built drawings should be prepared as facilities are completed, and should be made available 
to operation and maintenance personnel and to the dam inspection staff. 
b. Construction Record 
All phases of the construction should be documented, including reporting of routine and special 
activities. Changes in construction plans and departures from expected site conditions should be 
documented, with any consequent design changes. The record should include information on 
materials and construction processes, field exploration and test results, geologic mapping of 
foundations and excavations, inspection records, as-built drawings, and decisions to adapt the 
design to actual field conditions. 
A formal plan for a construction inspection system should be developed, including inspection 
procedures and types and forms of reports. The system should identify and record the status of 
inspection of approved and rejected materials. Survey notes, sketches, and records of all 
materials tests made for the control of construction quality should be maintained for the life of 
the project. A job diary should be maintained for each construction contract to provide a 
complete history of the work, listing in chronological order the events having a bearing on 
performance of the work, and analysis of cause and effects of special events. Photographic 
documentation of significant events, findings, and safety problems should be provided. The 
inspection program and record should give special attention to factors that may have a future 
influence on dam safety. 
Documentation must also be provided, as required, by applicable procurement, safety and health 
personnel, and financial regulations. 
c. Initial Reservoir Filling and Surveillance Record 
An initial reservoir filling and surveillance plan should be prepared by the design staff. Initial 
filling should be well documented, including a record of reservoir elevations and controlled 
water releases during the filling. The record should include complete written justification and 
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design approval of any deviations from the planned filling. The surveillance record should 
include all information obtained from inspection of the dam, appurtenant structures, abutments, 
and reservoir rim during the initial filling. 
d. Operation and Maintenance Record 
Operation and maintenance should be fully documented, including the routine activities and 
systematic inspection processes, and complete information on project maintenance, 
rehabilitation, and improvements. In addition to records on the actual operations, the operating 
record should include data on reservoir levels, inflow and outflow, drainage system discharge 
and structural behavior. 
If there are maintenance problems that require continuing remedial work, a thorough record of 
the work should be maintained, and a final report made after complete remedy of the problem. 
e. Permanent Files 
One copy of all documents concerning the project should be assembled in a single project file. 
The file should be kept up to date and should be maintained as a permanent archival reference. A 
second file of the materials should always be easily accessible to responsible personnel for 
reference in future reviews and inspections, and in dealing with problems, repairs, etc. Both files 
should be continuously updated with records on problems, repairs, operation, instrumentation, 
and inspection for the life of the project. Information such as foundation reports and as-built 
drawings and maps should be permanently retained at the project and also at the agency's 
engineering design office. 
6. Reviews 
a. Extent 
All factors affecting the safety of a dam during design, construction, and operation should be 
reviewed on a systematic basis at appropriate levels of authority. Reviews include those internal 
to the agency, and those external to the agency, by individuals or boards (consultants) with 
recognized expertise in dam planning, design, and construction. 
b. Internal 
Provision should be made for automatic internal review of all design decisions, methods, and 
procedures related to dam safety. Review should be at levels of authority above the design 
section or designer-supervisor relation. Uniformity of criteria and design technique should be 
maintained, as well as methods to ensure that specific experience is exchanged and used to 
advance the agency's ability to design, construct, and operate safe dams. 
Management technical personnel should review the construction periodically. Reviewing 
personnel should include geologists, geotechnical engineers, and embankment and/or structural 
engineers who have had experience in responsible positions relating to similar structures. When 
appropriate, the reviews should include mechanical and/or electrical equipment engineers. 
Preconstruction inspection should be made after geologic mapping is done and prior to ground 
surface disturbance. On large projects, construction reviews would normally be at critical 
construction periods such as start and completion of foundation preparation and grouting, dam 
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construction at several stages, and completion of the dam. Visits by appropriate personnel are 
recommended every six months, and to accompany the consultants during scheduled reviews. 
The final construction inspection should cover inspection of completed structures and equipment, 
the adjacent valley floor and abutments, and the reservoir rim. 
On smaller projects, the frequency of construction review and the disciplines represented in the 
review would vary with the size and complexity of the project. However, management should 
make certain that construction reviews arc sufficient to cover the requirements for dam safety. 
Reviews should be made of the agency's procedures for post-construction operation and periodic 
inspections. These would include the responsibilities for collection and evaluation of data from 
any dam instrumentation. 
Reviews should be made to ensure that the project emergency preparedness plan is periodically 
updated. 
Formal documentation should be made of all significant findings from reviews and inspections. 
c. External 
The need for review of a dam by independent experts (consultant board or firm) from outside the 
agency should be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the degree of hazard, size of 
the dam, complexity of the site geology and geotechnology, complexity of the design, or a 
specific need perceived by the public. Consultant reviews should provide appropriate overview 
evaluations of site investigation, design, and construction. 
Consultant reviews of operation and maintenance practices, and of alterations and improvements, 
should be conducted when the agency considers such reviews advisable. 
The following text deals first with design and construction reviews. Applicable portions apply 
also to post-construction reviews; specifics for post-construction reviews are in the last 
paragraph of the section. 
The agency should be represented at each consultant meeting by appropriate design and 
construction staff. When appropriate, meetings should include a site visit. At each meeting the 
agency should formally document all aspects of the continued development of the project for 
presentation in a meeting-opening briefing to the consultants. The consultants should formally 
document findings and recommendations and present them at a closing conference with the 
agency staff. 
The consultant board members should be chosen to assure coverage of all areas of expertise 
needed to assess the dam design, construction, and safety. The board should contain at least 
three, but normally not more than five, permanent members. The board should always contain a 
general civil engineer, a geologist and/or geotechnical engineer, as appropriate, a concrete and/or 
embankment dam engineer, and usually a member for the electrical and mechanical features, 
especially necessary if a power plant is part of the project. Additional specialists covering 
specific aspects such as structural integrity, earthquake response, or three-dimensional analysis 
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should be assigned for short intervals as recommended by the board. The board should be formed 
during the design stage and consulted (if possible) on site selection, on type of structure, and for 
input to the feasibility study. The board should be kept active throughout design and 
construction, in order to keep the board completely familiar with all aspects of the project so they 
are in a position to respond rapidly if problems arise. 
During design and construction of large projects, the board should meet every 6 to 12 months, 
depending upon activities and duration of the work. Meetings should be scheduled to review at 
specific phases of construction. These phases might include, but not be limited to, review during 
the early stages of foundation cleanup and treatment, on completion of foundation cleanup, and 
during the early stages of embankment and/or concrete placement. All board members should 
attend every meeting even though some meetings may not apply to all members. This would 
ensure that the entire board is fully aware of the complete work status before being asked for 
their input on specific points. 
The briefing to the board by agency personnel at the start of a meeting should include 
exploration data, structural adequacy and seepage characteristics of the foundation, proposed 
foundation treatment, grouting programs, quarry test data, test fill data, embankment 
requirements for zones and material for those zones, sources of materials, compaction 
requirements, inspection requirements, instrumentation program, type of spillway (gated or 
ungated), proposed water release control systems, diversion requirements and care and diversion 
of water, power generation anticipated, and surge tank design. For concrete dams, the review 
would include concrete design and placement requirements in lieu of the embankment 
information. 
On a smaller project, the use of consultants should be commensurate with the dam size and 
complexity, and with the degree of associated hazard. If there is significant hazard, the agency 
should obtain consultant reviews adequate to assure independent assessment of the dam safety. 
Consultants should be engaged during agency evaluations of existing dams if considered 
necessary to provide independent support for agency assessment of dam safety. This might be in 
connection with studies for alterations or improvements for potential criticality of dam stability 
resulting from structure deterioration, or from increased reservoir levels due to possible flood 
inflows larger than design floods and consequent inadequate spillway capacity. It might involve 
consultation on seismic design; and in the case of old dams, especially embankment dams with 
inadequate records of materials properties, it might include consultation on the advisability and 
procedures for new materials investigations. Consultants on features of existing dams may be 
individuals rather than formal boards. 
7. Research and Development 
A strong research and development effort is a necessary element in reducing the uncertainties 
still present in dam design, hydrology and hydraulics, materials behavior, and construction 
techniques, equipment and practices. As part of their dam safety programs, agency management 
should identify opportunities and needs for research and programs to meet those needs both 
internally and through other agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the U.S. 
Geological Survey. 
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a. Methods and Materials 
Management should ensure that a continuing review is made of state-of-the-art methods, 
experience, research, etc., and that improvements are incorporated into agency criteria and 
methods of analysis, exploration, construction, testing, and instrumentation. The process should 
build from experience on past projects relating to constructability, observed behavior, problems 
encountered, and problem solutions tried and their results. Experience histories should be 
reviewed, summarized, and disseminated to evaluate current practice in order to advance agency 
practices. Research and development needed on materials and their use as revealed by dam 
observation and monitoring and new developments should be conducted on a continuing basis. 
Establishing a schedule of research priorities is necessary for overall research and development 
goals and for orderly and consistent progress in advancing dam technology.  
b. Risk-Based Analysis 
The agencies should individually and cooperatively support research and development of risk-
based analysis and methodologies as related to the safety of dams. This research should be 
directed especially to the fields of hydrology, earthquake hazard, and potential for dam failure. 
Existing agency work in these fields should be continued and expanded more specifically into 
developing risk concepts useful in evaluating safety issues. Existing work is exemplified by (1) 
the interagency research conference cited in paragraph c below, (2) its adjunct meetings on 
hydraulics and earthquakes, and (3) the NRC methods of risk evaluation for nuclear plants as 
applicable to radiological safety-related dams. 
c. Interagency Coordination 
Existing interagency research coordination activities should be continued, with attention to 
minimizing unnecessary duplication. The biennial research coordination conference on water 
resources among the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
and Bonneville Power Administration is an example of beneficial exchange needed on issues 
relating to dam safety. 
8. Contracts 
a. Documents 
Agency procedures should ensure that all contracts for dam design, construction, and operation 
are written to accomplish the design intent and to require that contractors provide complete 
documentation of their work. 
b. Modifications 
During the construction period, any modifications in the design or construction which result from 
significant departures from expected field conditions, design reviews, or other studies should be 
promptly included in revisions to appropriate contracts. Such modifications, and any discovered 
later, that affect operation should be included in operation contracts (and in agency operation, 
monitoring, and maintenance policy). The basis and justification for any change should be 
documented. 
9. Constraints 
Many constraints which are outside agency authority can directly or indirectly affect dam safety. 
Managers at all levels must be continually aware of their fundamental responsibilities for dam 
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safety and exercise vigilance in identifying constraints on fulfilling those responsibilities. Every 
manager has a duty to seek resolution or mitigation of such constraints through his own agency 
channels or through interagency or intergovernmental channels as appropriate and available to 
him. 
a. Funding for Organizational Management  
Continuity and adequacy of funding are essential to carry out the various programs which ensure 
safe dams. The Zero Based Budget system offers an opportunity to managers to identify for high 
funding priority those activities, programs, staff levels, and other operating requirements of a 
sound dam safety program. Managers should avail themselves of this opportunity. Agencies 
should cooperatively develop common budgetary terms and consistent processes to provide the 
necessary visibility of dam safety funding essentials at all levels and within all branches of the 
government. Long-term programming objectives should be established and adhered to, to meet 
the requirements of organization management, personnel staffing and training, research and 
development, quality construction and operation, a complete program of inspection and 
evaluation of the safety of existing dams, and a planned program for the rehabilitation and/or 
improvement of existing dams. 
b. Public Concerns 
Public individuals and groups should have the opportunity to voice their concerns in the 
development of public works projects and during their operation. These concerns often represent 
constraints in the form of local or regional political interests, legislation, perceptions of risk and 
hazard, environmental factors, social conflicts, etc., which can influence technical decisions. 
Agencies should develop and organize their procedures for early assimilation of those public 
views which affect possible design, construction, or operating parameters and, in turn, influence 
dam safety. Resolution of public issues conflicts and problems, including use of executive and 
legislative government decisions, should be made prior to the start of construction so that dam 
safety is not compromised. 
B. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES — SITE INVESTIGATION AND 
DESIGN (SID) 
This section of the guidelines outlines the site investigation and design technical activities that 
agency management should ensure are undertaken to obtain safe design of dams. It is recognized 
that the extent of application of these guidelines will vary depending on the size and function of 
the dam. 
1.  Hydrology 
a. Hazard Evaluation 
Areas impacted by dam construction and existing dams should be examined for potential hazards 
to present and future developments in the event of major flooding by controlled flood discharges 
or flooding induced by dam failure or misoperation. This hazard evaluation is the basis for 
selection of the performance standards to be used in dam design or in evaluation of existing 
dams. 
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b. Flood Development 
Hypothetical floods, generally of severe magnitude, should be developed for use in design or 
evaluation of major dam and reservoir features, including development of appropriate floods for 
the construction period. 
c. Flood Selection for Design (or Evaluation) 
The selection of the design flood should be based on an evaluation of the relative risks and 
consequences of flooding, under both present and future conditions. Higher risks may have to be 
accepted for some existing structures because of irreconcilable conditions. 
When flooding could cause significant hazards to life or major property damage, the flood 
selected for design should have virtually no chance of being exceeded. If lesser hazards are 
involved, a smaller flood may be selected for design. However, all dams should be designed to 
withstand a relatively large flood without failure even when there is apparently no downstream 
hazard involved under present conditions of development. 
d. Hydrologic Design of Reservoir 
In addition to selection of a design flood, the hydrologic design of a new reservoir or the 
evaluation of an existing project involves consideration of discharge and storage capacities, 
reservoir regulation plans including constraints, land requirements, and wind/wave effects. The 
evaluation of existing projects also should include observed performance capabilities and 
whether improvements are necessary to ensure safety. 
Reservoir regulation plans should be developed in the planning of projects so that realistic 
release rates will be used in routing the design flood. Regulation plans should include the 
construction period. When gate operations are involved, a water control management plan should 
be established to direct reservoir regulation in an effective and efficient manner. An emergency 
regulation plan is also required for use by the dam tender in the event of loss of communication 
with the water control management staff during a flood. A data information system should be 
designed to collect and process pertinent hydro meteorological data in a timely and reliable 
manner. 
The reservoir regulation plans, water control management plan, and data information systems 
should be periodically reviewed for safely deficiencies and potential for misoperation during 
both severe flood events and normal conditions. Necessary corrections should be made as soon 
as practicable. 
e. Downstream Effects 
Safety design includes studies to ascertain areas that would be flooded during occurrence of the 
design flood and in the event of dam failure. The areas downstream from the project should be 
evaluated to determine the need for land acquisition, flood plain management, or other methods 
to prevent major damage. Information should be developed and documented suitable for 
releasing to downstream interests regarding remaining risks of flooding. 
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f. Warning Systems 
Safety design should include an emergency flood warning system and action plan that would 
effectively notify all concerned in ample time for appropriate action. 
2. Earthquake Investigation and Design 
a. Investigation Factors 
The following factors should be considered in selection of design earthquakes. 
(1) Geologic and tectonic setting of the site area by analysis of the lithology, stratigraphy, 
structural geology, and tectonic history. 
(2) Historical earthquake record to include the size, location, and other seismological 
characteristics as available, and the relationship, if possible, with the tectonic siting of the area in 
which the earthquakes have occurred. 
(3) Influence of the properties of the surficial materials on the determination of the size of 
historical earthquakes. 
(4) Influence of faulting or other tectonic features on the estimate of the occurrence, size, and 
location of possible future earthquakes. 
b. Selection of Design Earthquakes 
From the above factors, earthquakes should be selected that have sufficient potential of occurring 
to require consideration in the dam design. Earthquake description should include estimates to 
the extent practical of the size, location, depth, focal mechanism, and frequency of occurrence. 
c. Engineering Seismology 
Determination should be made of the characteristics of ground motion that would be expected 
from the design earthquakes, to the extent possible, to include amplitude (displacement, velocity 
and acceleration), frequency content, and duration. 
d. Need for Earthquake Analysis 
The probable effects of earthquakes on the dam and its appurtenant structures should be 
evaluated to determine the need for inclusion of earthquake forces in the structures analyses. 
Evaluation includes consideration of factors such as the project stage, hazard and risk factors, the 
size of the dam and reservoir, the potential ground motion at the site, site geology, and type of 
structure. Where determination is made that no earthquake forces are required in analysis, the 
determination should be justified. 
e. Seismic and Geologic Studies 
(1) Earthquake Sources. The essential first step is determination of the design seismic events 
(usually the maximum credible earthquakes) and an estimate of the ground motion at the site due 
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to these events. From a study of the regional tectonics and seismicity, and both regional and local 
geology, potential sources for seismic events are identified, and the maximum credible 
earthquake magnitudes postulated. 
(2) Design Events. A maximum credible earthquake (MCE) is defined herein as the hypothetical 
earthquake from a given source that could produce the severest vibratory ground motion at the 
dam. Time histories of the estimated rock motion (accelerograms) at the dam for the various 
seismic events are selected to characterize the severity of the strong motions by their peak 
accelerations, frequency content, and duration. 
f. Design for Earthquake Forces 
(1) Safety Concerns. All earthquake-related safety concerns should be identified. Potential safety 
concerns include but should not be limited to dam foundation integrity, stability, unacceptable 
stress levels, fault displacements; abutments stability; effects of dam overtopping; dam stability; 
susceptibility of embankment dams to embankment or foundation liquefaction, cracking or 
excessive deformation. 
A survey of component and accessory structures and equipment should be made to identify those 
which have functions that are essential for earthquake-related safety. 
(2) Analysis Method. Determination of appropriate earthquake analysis methods for evaluation 
of safety concerns may be, as appropriate, by qualitative evaluations, pseudostatic analysis, and 
dynamic analysis. The methods selected should be appropriate to the identified safety concerns, 
in accordance with good engineering practice and with currently available technology. 
(3) Structural Adequacy. Structural adequacy assessments should be made of all safety-related 
components and concerns identified. These assessments should incorporate all applicable data 
and analysis. 
3. Geotechnics
a. General 
(1) Site Specifics. After a site is selected, a program for the geotechnical exploration, design, and 
analysis of that specific site is required. No checklist can be made which would cover all 
eventualities at all sites, or at any one site, and attempts to formulate such a list would be 
counterproductive to the intent to ensure dam safety. The best insurance for adequate 
geotechnical work is a well-trained and experienced staff actively involved in field inspections 
throughout all phases of the development of the site. 
(2) Documentation. Because many evaluations are possible for a given set of geotechnical 
conditions, it is important that full documentation be made of the reasoning process involved in 
geotechnical decisions. General guidelines for documentation are given in section III.A.5. 
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(3) Management of Diverse Technical Expertise. Geotechnical work encompasses the expertise 
of geologists, geophysicists, and engineers—all with diverse experience, training, interest, and 
technical terminology. The administrative and technical supervision of these experts should be 
structured to optimize coordination and cooperation. Management should encourage intellectual 
curiosity and an inquisitive approach to all geotechnical work. Since the field of geotechniques is 
rapidly expanding, management should assure that those associated with site exploration and 
development maintain currency with the state of the art. 
b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems 
The exploration program needs to be site specific, flexible, and executed so as to obtain the 
maximum data from each part of the program. Agency management should ensure sufficient 
funding for an orderly development of the exploration program in order to reduce uncertainties 
and to make adequate provisions for required corrective measures. 
The initial onsite exploration should be preceded by a review of all available information 
pertinent to the development of the site (literature, maps, photographs, well and spring 
information, seismic data, area construction records, etc.). This should lead to the preparation of 
a detailed geological map of the site using all available data. Geotechnical explorations generally 
proceed from wide-spaced borings and geophysical surveys to determine the general geological 
conditions, to additional explorations assigned in an ongoing sequence to develop the geologic 
correlations and to determine the type of dams suitable for the site. The extent, depth, and type of 
exploration depend on the complexity of the geology and size and type of dam. 
Generally, explorations are not complete at the end of the planning phase but continue during the 
preparation of plans and specifications and into the construction phase. Conditions encountered 
during construction often require additional explorations to evaluate the need for changes in the 
design. 
All potential geological problems, inferred from onsite data and from experience at similar sites, 
should be fully explored and described. This information should cover the types of adverse 
features and geologic processes generally associated with a geological environment similar to 
that at the site. It should also cover the expected short- and long-term behavior of foundation and 
reservoir rim materials at the site when subjected to the changed geological environment 
associated with the construction and operation of the dam and to geologic processes operating 
during the life of the project. 
During the course of the design and continued exploration of the project, all potential problems 
should be investigated and corrected with appropriate treatment, or where uncertainty remains, 
design defenses should be provided to control or monitor the problems. Types of problems which 
might require consideration include reservoir-induced seismicity, solubility, pipability and 
liquefaction potential of materials, foundation heave or deterioration during excavation, reservoir 
rim leakage and stability, past and future mining, and differential consolidation associated with 
petroleum or water extraction. 
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c. Geotechnical Design 
Geotechnical design considerations for the dam foundation and reservoir area are essentially 
defined after the geologic conditions of the site, the type of dam, and the magnitude of the 
stresses imposed on the foundation by the dam and reservoir have been determined. 
Foundation design typically consists of four distinct elements. These are (1) definition of the 
geometry of the foundations and areas of potential instability in the foundations, abutments, and 
slopes; (2) determination of the properties of foundation materials using judgment, past 
experience, laboratory testing, and in situ testing; (3) an analytical procedure that predicts the 
behavior of the foundation in terms of stability, permeability, and deformation; and (4) a 
reevaluation of parts (1) through (3) as construction progresses so that a comparison can be made 
of preconstruction assumptions and conditions with the actual conditions revealed by the 
foundation excavation and treatment. Additional exploratory work may be required. 
d. Foundation Treatment 
(1) General. The preparation of the foundation, including the abutments, is one of the most 
important phases of construction. The primary purposes of foundation treatment are to provide 
stability, obtain positive control of seepage, and minimum adverse deformation. The geology, 
foundation conditions, foundation treatment, and proposed structure should be considered 
together. 
(2) Stability. Surfaces should be prepared to provide a satisfactory contact between the foun 
dation and the overlying structure by removal of unsuitable materials. Deficiencies in the 
foundation which are not removed should either be treated by modification of the structure or by 
appropriate foundation treatment tailored to handle the conditions encountered. 
(3) Positive Control of Seepage. Highly permeable foundations should be treated by such 
measures as cutting off the pervious material, grouting, increasing the seepage path by upstream 
blankets, or controlling the seepage with drainage systems. Where appropriate, surficial cavities 
should be traced, cleaned out, and backfilled with material satisfying the design requirements. 
When cavities exist at depth, measures should be taken to ensure against the migration of cavity 
filling material. 
(4) Control of Piping. Silts and fine sands in the foundation, which are susceptible to piping, 
should be removed if practical, cut off near the downstream limits of the dam, covered with 
impervious material, or provided with filtered drainage systems. If pipable material is used in the 
dam, the foundation surface treatment should prevent migration of dam material into the 
foundation. 
(5) Deformation. Foundations subject to differential settlement or foundations having highly 
compressible anomalies can cause stress concentrations or cracking in dams. The foundation 
excavation should be shaped to remove abrupt changes in elevation to preclude excessive 
differential settlement or stress concentrations. Low shear strength material in a foundation can  
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cause shear failure. Excavation and replacement of low strength material is a positive method for 
treating a foundation that has either or both of these unfavorable conditions. 
e. Instrumentation 
Although a well conceived foundation instrumentation program serves to monitor the foundation 
and gives an indication of distress, it cannot of itself certify the safety of the foundation. The 
expertise of the engineer/geologist to analyze and design and prepare a foundation that will 
safely carry the loads and water pressure imposed by the dam and the reservoir is fundamental to 
the design adequacy of the foundation. The purposes of foundation instrumentation are fourfold: 
to (1) provide data to validate design assumptions; (2) provide information on the continuing 
behavior of the foundation; (3) observe the performance of critical known features; and (4) 
advance the state of the art of foundation engineering. 
The general requirements for foundation instrumentation should be determined early in the 
design of the project, and the rationale for the instrumentation should be thoroughly documented. 
Factors that will influence the need for and the type of instrumentation include the geology of the 
foundation, size and type of the dam and reservoir, and the location of the project. Flexibility 
must be provided in the program to allow for changes from anticipated foundation conditions 
that are encountered during construction and/or operations. 
Intrinsic to an instrumentation program is the schedule for reading the instruments before and 
during construction, during initial reservoir filling, and through the service life of the project. No 
less important is the need for clear instructions for the prompt evaluation of data and prompt 
notification to responsible personnel when observations are atypical or diverge markedly from 
the design assumptions. 
f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction 
Those responsible for the investigation and design of the foundation should make onsite 
evaluations to confirm that actual conditions conform to those assumed in the design and to 
review documentation of site conditions. 
A qualified project geologist should examine and map geologic details of the foundation as it is 
being exposed during construction. Investigation and testing at this point provide details useful in 
controlling grouting and other improvements and in confirming the competency of the 
foundation. Even though extensive exploration and testing may have been conducted prior to 
construction, most foundations can be expected to reveal unanticipated conditions which may 
require redesign or changes in the type or extent of foundation treatment. 
Approval should be obtained from the geotechnical and design staffs before placement of dam 
materials on the foundation. This approval should be documented and should indicate that all 
unanticipated conditions encountered were dealt with and that the foundation and its treatment 
meet the design requirements. 
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g. Reevaluation at Existing Structures 
Older Federal dams may not have been designed to standards equal to current criteria. Also, a 
substantial portion of safety-related dam incidents are associated with foundation problems 
which develop in a time-dependent fashion after construction. For these reasons, systematic 
reevaluation of existing Federal dams should be made. 
These reevaluation should go beyond analysis of problems which are observed visually or from 
instrumentation data. A review should be made of all existing exploratory information, design 
information, construction records, and operation records, to determine the adequacy of the 
foundation with respect to the present site of the dam. Where available information is insufficient 
or where deficiencies are found or suspected, modern criteria for analysis, instrumentation, 
exploration, and testing should be used as appropriate to gather the necessary data to show that 
no problem exists or to furnish information to modify the structure or foundation. 
4. Hydraulic Appurtenances 
a. General 
(1) Protective Measures. All hydraulic appurtenances used for releasing water should be 
designed to preclude jeopardy to the damming provisions. 
(2) Blockage. Allowances for or preclusion of blockage of hydraulic facilities should be incor 
porated in the design. 
(3) Reliability. When operational failure of a gated passage would jeopardize the damming 
provisions, alternate capacity should be provided. When operation of a gated passage is essential 
to safety, reliable manpower, communications and accessibility should be assured. 
(4) Hydraulics and Hydrology. Hydraulic and hydrologic design considerations should be 
correlated with section III.B.1. 
b. Design Flood Releases 
(1) Spillway and Outlets. Gated spillways are the usual hydraulic appurtenances for control of all 
or the major portion of the design flood and major emergency releases. Outlets (sluiceways, 
conduits and tunnels) may be used alone or in conjunction with spillways to control flood 
discharges. 
(a) Selection of type. Spillways and outlets should be selected to meet the site specific purposes 
of the project. For a drainage area with short concentration time combined with reservoir storage 
capacity that is small relative to the flood volume, especially for embankment dams, (1) the 
spillway should usually be uncontrolled, and (2) outlets should not normally be used for sole or 
part control of the design flood except in special cases where the outlets can be uncontrolled. 
(b) Capacity. Spillway and outlet capacity should be sufficient to satisfy the discharge 
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(2) Power Facilities. A portion of installed turbine flow capacity may be considered to assist in 
control of the design flood if it is demonstrated that possible power load interruptions during the 
design flood would not preclude operation of the power facilities. 
c. Other Water Releases 
Other water release hydraulic appurtenances such as navigation facilities, locks, fish facilities, 
ice sluices, trash sluices, and water quality facilities should conform to the requirements of 
section 4.a. 
d. Reservoir Evacuation 
Where practicable, reservoir release facilities should be provided to lower the pool to a safe level 
adequate to correct conditions that might threaten the integrity of the dam. 
e. Control of Flows during Construction 
The provisions of section 4.a also apply generally to the design of hydraulic appurtenances used 
during construction. The capacity of these appurtenances should be sufficient to satisfy the 
discharge requirements of the regulation plan for control of water during construction. 
f. Design Criteria and Guidance 
(1) General. If existing design criteria and guidance from past projects and experience are used 
for design of the hydraulic appurtenances, their sufficiency should be documented. 
(2) Hydraulic Model Tests. When sufficient criteria and guidance are not available for analytical 
design of the hydraulic appurtenances, physical hydraulic model studies should be performed. 
(3) Prototype Testing. Features of safety-related hydraulic appurtenances that are beyond the 
state of the art, or for which model to prototype relationships have not been verified, should be 
tested in the prototype. 
g. Reanalysis Because of Changes 
Changes in project purpose, new purposes, operational requirements, limitations of constraints, 
design criteria, or legal requirements may require that a reanalysis be made of the hydraulic 
appurtenances. 
h. Hydraulic Design Involvement during Life of Structure 
Hydraulic design engineers should participate in the project periodic inspection program to 
evaluate the operational adequacy of all hydraulic appurtenances essential to dam safety 
throughout the life of the structure including final disposition. 
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5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dams 
a. Site Specific Design 
Because all dam sites are unique, the type of dam and its appurtenances should be specifically 
matched to site conditions and project requirements. It is essential when reviewing the safety of 
existing dams to consider conditions which may have changed physically and new concepts 
resulting from new technology, or because of additional project information since construction, 
such as foundation deterioration, increased flood hydrographs, or larger design earthquakes. 
b. Materials 
Concrete for the structures requires competent investigation of materials sources and adequacy of 
supply testing of materials properties in accordance with accepted standards, and proper 
proportioning of concrete mixes (including additives) for strength, durability, control of thermal 
properties, and economy. 
c. Design of Structures
There are three components of a dam which must be considered for safety: the foundation, the 
dam, and its appurtenant structures. 
(1) Foundation. Proper design of a concrete dam requires information on the foundation 
geological conditions and materials properties to assure its capability to support the loads of the 
dam and reservoir, in its natural state or as improved by foundation treatment. 
(2) Dam. Concrete dams should be designed to be safe against overturning and sliding without 
exceeding allowable stresses of the foundation and the concrete for all loading conditions 
imposed on the dam. The shape and/or curvature of a dam and its contact with the foundation are 
extremely important in providing stability and favorable stress conditions. Proper consideration 
should be given to ensure the dam's safety in the event of overtopping. 
Joints in the dam should be properly designed to control cracking due to thermal, shrinkage, and 
structural effects. Temperature control measures such as proper concrete mix design, pre-cooling 
of the concrete mix, and post-cooling of the concrete blocks can also be used to control cracking. 
Openings in the dam such as waterways, galleries, chambers, and shafts should be designed with 
consideration for their effects on the behavior of the structure. 
(3) Appurtenances. Safety-related appurtenances, such as outlet works structures, spillways, and 
navigation locks, should be designed with the same degree of safety as the main dam.  If the 
project has a powerhouse as an integral part of the dam, it should be designed for the same safety 
requirements as the dam. 
d. Definition of Loads 
The dam and appurtenances should be designed for all static and dynamic loads to which they 
will be subjected. Dynamic loadings to be considered should include inertial, hydrodynamic, and 
earth pressures from earthquake ground motions and structural response; and dynamic loads 
resulting from flowing water. 
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e. Design Methods 
The methods required for design of the several types of concrete dams and their appurtenances 
vary from simple to complex, depending on the type and size of the structure, the hazard 
potential of the site, the kinds of loading, and foundation conditions. The design process involves 
judgment and analytical expertise to select appropriate methods to analyze a structure whether it 
requires a simple or complex analysis, and to determine design input data that is representative of 
the range and variation of foundation and structural material properties. The selection of input 
parameters is just as important as the mechanics of the analysis used. 
f. Design Evaluation 
Technically qualified supervisory personnel should assure that structures are designed to meet 
the requirements for safety. This includes confirmation of design input parameters, design 
methods, and utilization of allowable factors of safety against overturning, sliding, and stressing 
appropriate to the probability of the loading conditions. 
g. Instrumentation 
Knowledge of the behavior of structures and their foundations may be gained by studying the 
service action of the structures using observations on embedded and other internal 
instrumentation and external measurements. Information from which a continuing assurance of 
the structural safety of the dam can be assessed is of primary importance, but information on 
structure behavior and the properties of dam and foundation materials serve to verify the design 
and to provide information for improvement of design. Observations may be made in the dam 
and foundation in terms of strain, deflection, pressure, temperature, stress, deformation, and 
drainage flows. External measurements for deflection and settlements may be made by precise 
surveys on targets set on the dam, in galleries, in vertical wells in the dam, in tunnels, and on the 
foundation. Status reports on the condition of structures should be issued regularly. Examinations 
of existing structures should include assessments of whether additional instrumentation is 
required. 
h. Construction and Operational Follow-up 
It is necessary that the designers should be involved in the construction and operation processes 
to confirm that the design intent is carried out, and to allow changes and modifications resulting 
from redesign necessitated by differences between design assumptions and actual field or 
operating conditions. 
6. Embankment Dams 
Section 5 contains general dam considerations; the following additional considerations are 
applicable to embankment dams. 
a. Site Specific Design 
Embankment design should be developed for specific site conditions and based on adequate 
exploration and testing to determine all pertinent geologic and material factors with particular 
emphasis on shear strength and stability, permeability and control of seepage, and consolidation 
and settlement. 
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Embankment dams are particularly vulnerable to damage and possible failure from internal 
erosion when founded on rock having large cavities, open joints, discontinuities, or other 
geologic defects. The sites should be carefully explored and special attention given to design of 
cutoffs, foundation treatment, and other defensive measures. Special problems related to 
embankment integrity may include soft rock such as clay shales, areal subsidence, old mining 
activity, solution-susceptible rock, and collapsing soils. 
b. Materials 
Embankments can generally be designed to utilize locally available construction material; 
investigation of materials characteristics is required and problem materials should be either 
discarded or protected by defensive design. There is often a need for importing special materials 
for slope protection, filters, and drainage systems.  Any embankment zoning should consider the 
properties and quantities of available materials and the effect of their characteristics on the 
construction process. 
c. Design Constructability 
Embankment designs should be constructible with regard to such items as location of borrow 
areas with respect to flooding, in-situ moisture conditions, climatic effects on construction 
schedules, width of zoning, and needs for special material processing. Design should include 
protection of critical features from overtopping by floods during construction. 
d. Embankment Design 
The safety of an embankment is dependent on its continued stability without excessive 
deformation under all conditions of environment and operation, and on control of seepage to 
preclude adverse effects on stability and prevent migration of soil materials. Design 
considerations given below are specific to embankment dams. 
(1) Seismic. Where earthquake design is necessary, consideration should be given to earthquake-
related concerns of soil liquefaction and cracking potential, stability and excessive deformation, 
abutment stability, overtopping effects, and required defensive measures. 
(2) Stability. Embankment stability should be analyzed for all pertinent static and dynamic 
loading conditions without exceeding allowable shearing stresses in the embankment or 
foundation. Factors of safety should be appropriate to the probability of the loading conditions, 
and should consider the effects of loading and time on shear strength, particularly if limited 
placement volume can result in rapid construction. In most cases, embankments should be 
designed for unrestricted rates of reservoir filling and drawdown. 
(3) Settlement and Cracking. The potential for transverse cracking of the embankment caused by 
differential settlement, tension zones, and possible hydraulic fracturing should be minimized by 
careful consideration of abutments, foundation and cutoff trenches, and their geometry and 
treatment. Filter zones of adequate size should be positioned upstream and downstream of the 
impervious zone at all locations where there is a possibility of transverse cracking regardless of 
cause. Potential problems of differential settlement should be considered in establishing the 
construction sequence. 
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(4) Seepage. The design should attempt to prevent or minimize seepage through the embankment 
and its foundation and abutments; however, the designer should recognize that seepage usually 
occurs and that protective control measures must be provided. Filtering transition zones and 
foundation and abutment treatment to seal openings should be provided wherever necessary to 
preclude migration of soil materials into or out of all embankment element contacts both 
upstream and downstream. Filters, drainage blankets, and transitions should be of a quality and 
size to conservatively control and safely discharge seepage for all conditions for the life of the 
project. Particular attention should be given to contacts with foundation, abutments, embedded 
structures, and the end slope of closure sections to ensure adequate compaction and bonding to 
control seepage. 
(5) Zoning. Embankment zoning when used should ensure adequate stability for all pertinent 
conditions, and should control seepage through the embankment and provide filter action to 
prevent migration of material. 
(6) Erosion. Upstream and downstream slopes and foundation and abutment contacts should be 
protected against erosion from surface runoff, wave action, and impinging currents. Spillways 
and outlet works should be located and designed so that discharges do not erode the embankment 
or its foundation. 
e. Instrumentation 
Embankment design and prediction of embankment performance are based on an imprecise 
combination of theory and empirical procedure; consequently, performance during construction 
and operation should be monitored by a designed system of external measurements and/or 
installed instrumentation. A well planned system of instruments, when appropriate, should be 
installed to provide data on internal and external movements and on water pressures at critical 
locations in the embankment and foundation during both construction and operation. 
f. Construction and Operational Follow-up 
In addition to the need for designers to be involved in construction and operation of dams in 
general to confirm the design intent and assess the need for possible design changes, certain 
other requirements should be observed at embankment dams.  Stability should be evaluated 
during and after construction using strength parameters from as-placed materials and 
observations of pore pressure and seepage if and when conditions warrant. Designers should 
inspect and review performance of embankments during and after reservoir impoundment to 
detect and provide prompt remedial treatment for problems. While major emphasis is placed on 
initial impoundment, the surveillance should continue for the life of the project. As the state of 
the art advances in analysis, material behavior, and methods of observation, deficiencies in 
embankments may be suspected or become obvious and should be investigated and corrected. 
Collected experience information should be summarized and used to further advance the state of 
the art. 
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C. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES — CONSTRUCTION (CON) 
1. Introduction 
This section of the guidelines outlines the construction technical activities that agency 
management should ensure are undertaken to obtain safe construction of dams. The principles 
and guidelines arc prepared in a broad sense to ensure that construction of a safe structure is the 
prime requisite. 
a. Construction Contracts 
Construction contracts should be based on site conditions as interpreted at the time of contract 
award. All anticipated work on foundation cleanup, preparation, and treatment should be 
included as specified items of the work. Contract provisions should require the contractor to 
submit to the construction engineer advance notice of significant shift change, to enable adequate 
inspection coverage of multishift operations. 
b. Construction/Design Interface 
Many aspects of construction directly overlap in design considerations. Reference is made below 
to numbered paragraphs in Section III.B. Management of Technical Activities-Site Investigation 
and Design, which concern such common interests: 
3. Geotechnics 
a. General 
(1) Site Specifics 
b. Exploration and Identification of Geotechnical Problems  
c. Geotechnical Design 
d. Foundation Treatment  
e. Instrumentation  
f. Inspection and Continuing Evaluation during Construction 
4. Hydraulic Appurtenances 
e. Control of Flows during Construction 
5. Concrete Dams and Concrete Elements of Embankment Dams 
a. Site Specific Design 
b. Materials 
c. Design of Structures 
(1) Foundation 
g. instrumentation  
h. Construction and Operational Follow-up 
6. Embankment Dams 
a. Site Specific Design 
b. Materials 
c. Design Constructability 
d. Embankment Design 
(3) Settlement and Cracking 
(4) Seepage 
34 e. Instrumentation 
f. Construction and Operational Follow-up 
2. Evaluation during Construction
Field personnel must be highly trained and experienced if the design principles and site 
conditions are to be understood and a safe structure is to be constructed. 
When differing site conditions (different from those anticipated) are encountered, construction 
supervisory forces must have authority to suspend any or all portions of the work affected until 
the design engineers, with assistance as needed, can evaluate the condition and determine if 
design modification is required. 
Construction milestones should be identified when the design engineers will inspect the work 
and concur with the progress of construction. 
3. Orientation of Construction Engineers and Field Inspectors 
Construction engineers need to be aware of design philosophies and assumptions as to site 
conditions and function of project structures, and must understand the designers' intent 
concerning special technical provisions in the specifications. Identified preconstruction 
activities should include the orientation of construction engineers to the site specificity of the 
design and to the close communication requirements with all concerned engineering disciplines 
during the construction process. For major projects, there should be periodic meetings between 
design and construction engineers to discuss upcoming construction activities. Also, during the 
initial stages of important construction activities, the construction engineers should request site 
inspection by the design engineers to assure construction procedures are in accordance with 
design requirements. 
Construction specifications, supplemental reports, and conferences to orient field personnel to 
the particular site, the features of the dam, and the designers' intent for construction should, as 
applicable, include the following: 
a. Design Related 
(1) Design concepts. Explanation of philosophies and assumptions and the reasons for special 
requirements in the specifications to assure accomplishment of design intent. 
(2) Construction sequence. Identification and explanation of the dates to which construction 
progress must conform to satisfy project requirements, and the special sequences for 
construction activities that are required by design. 
(3) Instrumentation systems. Description of the instrument types, their purpose, the procedures 
for installation of each instrument type, the method and time interval for reading each 
instrument, and the importance of prompt data transmission for analysis and feedback. 
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(4) Care and diversion of water. Description of the design features included to prevent and/or 
control flooding and turbidity and accomplish diversion and closure of the dam. This should 
also contain the design requirements for controlling normal flows through the work area to 
assure that construction is always accomplished under dry conditions. Critical aspects of the 
construction schedule related to flood problems should be emphasized. 
b. Foundation 
(1) Description. Discussion of the type of foundation conditions expected to exist, i.e., over 
burden, general rock description, formation weaknesses such as joints, shears and faults, and 
acceptable foundation conditions. 
(2) Excavation. Discussion of the depth and nature of materials expected to be encountered, the 
controls for dewatering and blasting, identification of critical areas, quantity estimates, and an 
acceptable foundation. 
(3) Preparation. Review of the methods of rock foundation preparations such as: cleaning; the 
use of wire mesh, mortar, shotcrete, or rock bolts; grouting, and treatment of faults, shears and 
joints; as well as subsequent exploration to assure desired results. Review of methods of earth 
foundation preparation. 
c. Materials
(1) Materials from required excavation. Definition of acceptable and unacceptable properties of 
materials, the usage and the processing requirements if used, and identification of waste area 
locations. 
(2) Other excavated materials. Identification of the location and amount of usable material, 
"based on current test data," available from all designated areas, including borrow pits. Review 
of the blasting methods that are expected to produce the desired rock quality and sizes. 
Discussion of the expected amounts of waste and the areas where borderline material may be 
used in lieu of wasting, such as in berms or certain zones of the downstream shell of an 
earthfill dam. 
(3) Embankment. Description of both acceptable and unacceptable material properties, place 
ment, and compaction procedures for each zone. Review of required procedures for areas 
adjacent to abutments, around instruments, and at interfaces between zones and/or structures. 
(4) Concrete and concrete materials. Identification of acceptable aggregate sources and review 
of mix designs, joint and surface treatment, finish requirements, form tolerances, and 
placement procedures. Cooling as well as hot and cold weather protection requirements should 
be defined. 
d. Construction General 
(1) Field control. Discussion of the quality assurance procedures required to control all phases 
of construction. Acceptable placement standards should be established for concrete, earth and 
rock materials, and embankments. 
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(2) Structural. Discussion of structural steel installation, reinforcing steel placement, and antic 
ipated problem areas and specified treatment for such areas. 
(3) Mechanical-electrical. Description of equipment installation requirements, special proce 
dures, performance tests, protective coatings, and protection devices such as ground fault 
indicators. 
(4) Environmental-Identification of those construction controls required to minimize environ 
mental damage, comply with environmental regulations, and assure public involvement. 
4. Construction Assurance 
a. Construction Procedures 
Agency criteria must assure that acceptable methods and procedures are specified and utilized 
to accomplish design requirements. At the same time, the design and construction 
organizations must maintain the flexibility necessary to modify design, material requirements, 
and construction specifications as conditions dictate without altering the basic design intent. 
b. Construction Materials Testing 
A materials laboratory must be established at the field construction office that is adequately 
staffed and equipped to accomplish the on-site testing requirements set forth in the engineering 
considerations and instructions to field inspection personnel. Provisions should be made for a 
thorough and periodic review "above project level" of the construction materials testing pro 
cedures to assure their continued suitability. Periodic companion test samples of embankment 
material should be checked by higher echelon for uniform test assurance. 
c. Quality Assurance 
It is mandatory that adequate construction quality assurance systems and procedures be 
established to assure safe dam construction. The quality assurance system must guarantee, by 
direct inspection and testing, that construction is accomplished in compliance with the contract 
plans and specifications. The quality assurance system must identify when site conditions 
require modification of the design to ensure construction of a safe dam and must document the 
construction activities and test results. Daily inspector’s reports, laboratory test data records, 
and photographs are the minimum mandatory methods of documentation. General guidelines 
for documentation are given in section III.A.5. 
As a part of the quality assurance program the contractor should normally be required to 
submit various plans for approval not limited to, but including, the following: 
Construction Schedule Safety Program 
Care and Diversion of Water (including pollution control)  
Fire Protection 
Plant Layout (including haulroads) 
Environmental Measures  
Equipment Inventory 
Dewatering Foundations and Borrow Areas 
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Excavation Sequence of Foundations and Borrow Areas 
Drilling and Blasting Procedures  
Concrete Placement  
Restoration of Construction Area 
D. MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES-OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE (O&M) 
This section of the guidelines outlines the technical activities for operation and maintenance, 
periodic inspection program, and emergency action planning that agency management should 
ensure are undertaken to obtain safe operation of dams. 
1. Operation and Maintenance 
a. General 
The intent is to define practices which will ensure safe operation of dams and reservoirs and to 
require a maintenance program that will provide timely repair of facilities. It is assumed that 
each Federal agency is responsible for proper operation and maintenance of dams that are 
owned by the agency or that are under its jurisdiction. 
Operation and maintenance personnel should be selected on the basis of their capability to 
acquire the knowledge needed to perform the many functions of operation and maintenance, 
and should be trained for the associated duties at each specific project. 
All operation and maintenance manuals should be kept current, and records should be 
maintained of instructions, inspections and equipment testing, with copies to those responsible 
for design and dam safety inspections. General guidelines for documentation are given in 
section III.A.5. 
In the following sections, outlets or outlet gates refer to gates or valves on any outlets such as 
sluices, conduits or tunnels, pumps, generating units, and infrequently operated plant intake 
and discharge gates. If the project has a navigation lock, emergency closure and other 
infrequently operated equipment are also included. 
b. Operating Procedures 
Written operating instructions should be prepared for the dam and its associated structures and 
equipment. The instructions should cover the functions of the dam and reservoir and describe 
procedures to follow during flood conditions to ensure dam safety. 
Reservoir operating rule curves should be available for each normal mode of operation and for 
emergency conditions. 
An auxiliary power system, such as a gasoline or diesel-operated generator, is essential if the 
outlet and spillway gates and other dam facilities are electrically operated. 
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All spillway and outlet gates should be tested on a regular schedule. The tests should include 
use of both the primary and the auxiliary power systems. 
Project security is a matter of concern at all major dams. This includes preventing structural 
damage by vandals or saboteurs and unauthorized operation of outlet or spillway gates. In most 
cases, restricting public access is essential, and in some instances armed guards may be 
necessary. 
Public safety is of paramount importance at all dams and reservoirs. Specifically, public safety 
on the reservoir, in areas adjacent to the reservoir, and below the dam should be considered, 
particularly in recreational areas. Safety measures should include identification of high 
watermarks to indicate past or probable reservoir levels and streamflows, posting of safety 
instructions at highly visible and key locations, and providing audible safety warnings 
upstream of and below outlets as appropriate. 
Communication should be maintained among affected governmental bodies and with the 
public to enhance the safety aspects of the operation of the dam. Communication alternatives 
include written communications, radio, telephone, television, and newspapers. 
c. Maintenance Procedures 
Written instructions should provide information needed for proper maintenance of all water 
control facilities. 
Specialists should prepare maintenance checklists indicating the maintenance procedures and 
protective measures for each structure and for each piece of operating, communications, and 
power equipment, including existing monitoring systems. Special attention should be given to 
known problem areas. 
Special instructions should be provided for checking operating facilities following floods, 
earthquakes, tornados, and other natural phenomena. 
Maintenance procedures include preventive measures such as painting and lubrication as well 
as repairs to keep equipment in intended operating condition, and minor structural repairs such 
as maintaining drainage systems and correcting minor deterioration of concrete and 
embankment surfaces. The design staff should be apprised of any significant maintenance 
work. 
2. Periodic Inspection Program 
a. General 
The purpose of a periodic inspection program is to verify throughout the operating life of the 
project the structural integrity of the dam and appurtenant structures, assuring protection of 
human life and property. Periodic inspections disclose conditions which might disrupt 
operation or threaten dam safety, in time for them to be corrected. When such conditions are 
encountered, it is necessary to determine the adequacy of structures and facilities to continue  
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serving the purposes for which they were designed, and to identify the extent of deterioration 
as a basis for planning maintenance, repair or rehabilitation. 
The following general principles and guidelines for a periodic inspection program should be 
used by Federal agencies responsible for operation or regulation of dams. 
All existing dams with a significant hazard potential should have a safety evaluation based on 
current technical guidelines and criteria. New dams added to the inspection program should be 
planned, designed, and constructed in accordance with current technical criteria. Improvements 
in dam technology require that dams and appurtenant structures be reassessed to assure dam 
safety for more stringent design and materials criteria. 
Periodic inspection of dams, reservoirs, and appurtenant structures involves important aspects 
other than dam safety; however, these guidelines encompass only dam safety issues. Each 
agency is responsible for assuring that the existing dams for which it is responsible are 
periodically inspected, and that new dams are re-inspected initially upon completion of 
construction and periodically thereafter. 
b. Types and Frequencies of Inspections 
The inspection types and intervals herein recommended are for general guidance in developing 
inspection programs for all Federal dams.  These guidelines do not preclude other inspections 
or more frequent inspections if deemed necessary depending on project history and importance 
of the facility. For some projects less frequent inspections may be permissible where hazard 
potential and structural integrity warrant such relaxation. 
To maintain control of the inspection program, a formal inspection schedule should be 
maintained which lists each feature to be inspected, frequency of inspection, date last 
inspected, date of last inspection report, maintenance record, description of repairs made, and 
date of next inspection. The schedule should also have a note on major alterations that are 
made. 
Inspection personnel should be selected carefully, have qualifications commensurate with their 
assigned levels of responsibility, and receive training in the inspection procedures. 
Qualifications and training required for inspection personnel may vary with the complexity of 
the facility and with the level of inspection. 
(1) Informal Inspections. The purpose of informal inspections is to have as far as practicable a 
continuous surveillance of the dam. Employees at the project are to make frequent observations 
of the dam and appurtenances and of operation and maintenance. They are to identify and 
report abnormal conditions in accordance with adequate instructions and guidance. A detailed 
checklist of items to be inspected may be provided. The instructions or checklists should be 
prepared specifically for the project by engineering and operating specialists. The personnel 
performing these inspections should be properly trained and made aware of the heavy reliance 
placed upon them, and the great importance and absolute necessity of their careful inspection 
and reporting. Any unusual conditions that seem critical or dangerous should be reported  
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immediately to the agency's inspection organization or to those assigned inspection 
responsibility. 
Particular attention should be given to detecting evidence of (or changes in) leakage, erosion,  
sinkholes, boils, seepage, slope instability, undue settlement, displacement, tilting, cracking, 
deterioration, and improper functioning of drains and relief wells. 
(a) Frequency of informal inspections. Informal inspections should be scheduled by ex 
perienced, trained engineers as needed according to the dam's size, importance, and potential 
for loss of life and damage to property. The schedule for inspection should be changed by the 
engineers as required to be responsive to observed changing conditions. 
Operating personnel should make an inspection immediately after any unusual event such as 
large floods, earthquakes, suspected sabotage, or vandalism. 
(b) Qualifications of personnel for informal inspections. Informal inspections in most instances 
can be performed satisfactorily by dam tenders or operation and maintenance personnel not 
formally educated in the field of engineering or geology. Persons selected to make informal 
inspections, however, must have sufficient training and experience to allow them to recognize 
abnormal conditions, must have demonstrated their ability to perform operation and 
maintenance functions, and must have an appreciation for the importance of their 
responsibilities. They must be provided adequate written instructions on performance of 
responsibilities and must be evaluated periodically to assure that they understand the 
requirements and are capable of performing them. In addition, procedures for monitoring 
structural performance, observing the structure, its foundation, abutments, and appurtenances, 
and reporting abnormal conditions must be clearly defined and understood by these personnel. 
(2) Intermediate Inspections. Intermediate inspections should include a thorough field in 
spection of the dam and appurtenant structures, and a review of the records of inspections 
made at and following the last formal inspection. If unusual conditions are observed that are 
outside the expertise of these inspectors, arrangements should be made for inspections to be 
conducted by specialists. 
(a) Frequency of intermediate inspections. Intermediate inspections should be performed 
preferably on an annual basis, but at least biennially, where there is a high probability that dam 
failure could result in loss of life. For other dams, intermediate inspections should be scheduled 
by responsible engineers on the basis of the dam's size, importance, and potential for damage 
to property. 
(b) Qualifications of personnel for intermediate inspections. Intermediate inspections should be 
performed by technically qualified engineers, experienced in the operation and maintenance of 
dams and trained to recognize abnormal conditions. The inspectors should have access to and 
be familiar with all permanent documentation, especially the operation and maintenance 
histories for the dam and should be directly responsible for and intimately familiar with the 
operating characteristics of the dam. The dam tender or operator should be a participant in 
these inspections. 
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(3) Formal and Special Inspections. A formal inspection is required periodically to verify the 
safety and integrity of the dam and appurtenant structures. Formal inspections should include a 
review to determine if the structures meet current accepted design criteria and practices. The 
inspection should include a review of all pertinent documents including instrumentation, 
operation, and maintenance and, to the degree necessary, documentation on investigation, 
design, and construction. In making the detailed inspection of the dam appurtenant structures 
and equipment, diving inspections of underwater structures affecting the integrity of the dam 
should be included. All formal inspections should be conducted by a team of highly trained 
specialists. To assure that a dam and its appurtenant facilities are thoroughly inspected, 
checklists should be prepared to cover the condition of structural, electrical, and mechanical 
features. This inspection should also verify that operating instructions are available and 
understood, instrumentation is adequate and data is assessed to assure structures are 
performing as designed, and there are emergency provisions for access to and communication 
with all project operating facilities. 
(a) Frequency of formal inspections. Formal inspections should be made periodically at 
intervals not to exceed 5 years. Depending on past experience or the project history, some 
dams may require more frequent formal inspections. 
(b) Frequency of special inspections. Special inspections should be performed immediately 
after the dam has passed unusually large floods and after the occurrence of significant 
earthquakes, sabotage, or other unusual events reported by operating personnel. 
(c) Qualifications of personnel for formal and special inspections. Formal and special 
inspections should be conducted under the direction of licensed professional engineers 
experienced in the investigation, design, construction, and operation of dams. The inspection 
team should be chosen on a site-specific basis considering the nature and type of the dam. The 
inspection team should comprise individuals having appropriate specialized knowledge in 
structural, mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, and embankment design; geology; concrete 
materials; and construction procedures. They must be capable of interpreting structural 
performance and relating conditions found to current criteria and safety aspects. It is 
imperative that the inspection team adequately prepare for the inspections by reviewing and 
discussing all documents relative to the safety of the dam. 
c. Instrumentation 
Instrumentation or performance observation devices are used to supplement visual inspections 
in evaluating the performance and safety of dams. Careful examination of instrumentation data 
on a continuing basis may reveal a possible critical condition. Conversely, instrumentation may 
be a means of assuring that an observed condition is not serious and does not require 
immediate remedial measures. 
(1) Adequacy of Instrumentation. Instrumentation to monitor structural and functional per 
formance should be installed in dams where complex or unusual site conditions have been 
encountered or where there is a high probability that failure could result in loss of life or 
extensive property damage. Instruments should be examined periodically for proper 
functioning. The adequacy of the installed instrumentation should be assessed from time to 
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time by specialists to determine if it is sufficient to help evaluate the performance of the dam. 
When required, additional instrumentation should be installed to confirm suspicious trends or 
to explore an indicated potential adverse trend. 
(2) Observation of Monitoring Devices. The instrumentation data should be collected by per 
sonnel trained specifically for the purpose, including training to recognize and immediately 
report to those responsible for inspections any anomalies in the readings or measurements. 
Performance observation data should be properly tabulated for record purposes. 
(a) Frequency of observations. The frequency of instrument readings should be established at 
the time the instrumentation system is designed in order to give a timely warning of possible 
adverse conditions. Whenever necessary, more frequent readings, sometimes as often as 
hourly, should be taken to monitor a suspected rapidly changing adverse condition. The 
frequency or number of readings may be reduced after the project has been in operation for an 
extended time and performance observation data indicates that readings have stabilized. 
(3) Data Analysis. It is essential that instrumentation data be processed, reviewed and assessed 
in a timely manner by specialists familiar with the design, construction, and operation of the 
project. Operation manuals and design information should be referred to in the evaluation of 
possible adverse trends. The performance observation data should be periodically analyzed to 
determine whether project structures are reacting as assumed in the design, and to detect 
behavior conditions that may indicate the need for corrective action. 
d. Correction of Deficiencies
The inspection program could reveal those deficiencies or potential deficiencies which, if 
uncorrected, could eventually lead to failure of the dam. Deficiencies may vary from 
emergency type items where immediate action is required, to non-emergency type items which 
must be corrected in a timely manner but do not present an immediate danger to the safety of 
the structure. In all cases corrective action should be made under the supervision of qualified 
personnel. Emergency action plans to be implemented when failure has already occurred or is 
imminent are discussed in Section III.D.3, Emergency Action Planning. 
(1) High Priority Corrective Action. High priority corrective action is required for deficiencies 
which could result in failure of the dam within a short period of time. Heads of agencies should 
have authorities, procedures and levels of delegation for transfer of funds and other emergency 
funding provisions to ensure they are adequate for accomplishing corrective actions in cases 
where time constraints will not permit allocation through the normal budget process. 
Procedures for seeking transfer authority beyond that delegated to the agency and/or requests 
for supplemental appropriations should also be reviewed to ensure such requests can be 
forwarded quickly and with all necessary supporting documentation to enable expeditious 
action by the President and/or the Congress. 
(2) Non-emergency Corrective Action. Non-emergency corrective action is action taken when 
there is no immediate threat to the safety or operation of the dam, nor any threat to life or 
property downstream. The corrective action should be scheduled in advance of the fiscal year 
in which the work is to be done to allow time for planning, funding through the normal 
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budgeting process, and arranging for special reservoir operations when required. Some of these 
deficiencies may be corrected through the regular operation and maintenance program 
discussed in Section III.D.1, Operation and Maintenance. 
(3) Follow-up Action. Periodic inspection reports should continue to list previously identified 
deficiencies along with any newly discovered deficiencies and show the status of corrective 
action. Appropriate inspection personnel should make frequent field examinations as long as 
the problem exists to see all corrective measures are being completed. When deficiencies are 
not corrected in a reasonable length of time, an investigation should be made to determine the 
reason for delay and appropriate management personnel should be notified of the findings. 
e. Documentation 
Proper documentation of the dam’s current condition and past performance is necessary to 
assess the adequacy of operation, maintenance, surveillance, and proposed corrective actions. 
A complete record or history of the investigation, design, construction, operation, maintenance, 
surveillance, periodic inspections, modifications, repair, and remedial work should be 
established and maintained so that relevant data relating to the dam is preserved and readily 
available for reference. This documentation should commence with the initial site investigation 
for the dam and continue through the life of the structure. 
(1) Instrumentation. All instrumentation observation data and evaluations thereof should be 
properly tabulated and documented for record purposes. Maintenance of instrumentation 
systems requires that details of the installation be available for a clear understanding of its 
functioning. A complete history of past repairs, testing, readings, and analyses should be 
available as pertinent reference data in the evaluation of current instrumentation data. 
(2) Inspections. All inspection observations, especially as related to the safety of the dam, 
should be documented. The extent and nature of inspection reports required for the informal, 
intermediate formal, and special inspections will vary in proportion to the intensity of the 
inspection and the nature of the findings. Informal inspection reports may range from 
memoranda to supervisors which describe conditions and corrective actions, to detailed 
accounts of an event or occurrence. Intermediate inspection reports may vary from similar 
memoranda or trip reports to more formal reports containing substantial records, detail, and 
recommendations. Formal and special inspections require complete formal technical reports of 
all findings, corrective actions and recommendations, for permanent record and reference pur 
poses in order to form a basis for major remedial work when required. 
All reports should be in a self-explanatory form that permits their retention as permanent 
records and should carefully document times of inspections, inspection personnel, and findings 
of the inspection. 
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(3) Correction of Deficiencies. All deficiencies corrected as a result of the recommendations 
contained in periodic inspection reports should be fully documented in report form and made a 
part of the permanent project record. Alterations made to the facility as a result of changes in 
criteria to meet current practices or changes in dam technology should be fully documented, 
including as-constructed drawings. 
3. Emergency Action Planning 
a. General 
It is intended that the guidelines for the design, construction, operation and maintenance, and 
inspection of dams will minimize the risk of future dam failures. Nevertheless, it is recognized 
that despite the adequacy of those guidelines and their implementation, the possibility of dam 
failures still exists. Even though the probability of such failures is small, preplanning is 
required to identify conditions which could lead to failure, in order to initiate emergency 
measures to prevent such failures as a first priority, and, if this is not possible, to minimize the 
extent and effects of such failure. These guidelines provide operating and mobilization 
procedures to be followed upon indication of an impending or possible dam failure or a major 
flood. 
Each Federal agency which owns or is responsible for dams and each public or private owner 
of a Federally regulated dam (hereinafter, dam agency or owner) should evaluate the possible 
modes of failure of each dam, indicators or precursors of failure for each mode, possible 
emergency actions appropriate for each mode, and the effects on downstream areas of failure 
by each mode. In every case the evaluation should recognize the possibility of sudden failure, 
and should provide a basis for such "worst case" emergency planning actions in terms of 
notification and evacuation procedures where failure would pose a significant danger to human 
life and property. Plans should then be prepared in a degree of detail commensurate with the 
hazard, and instructions provided to operators and attendants regarding the actions to be taken 
in an emergency. Planning should be coordinated with local officials, as necessary, to enable 
those officials to draw up a workable plan for notifying and evacuating local communities 
when conditions affecting dam safety arise. 
b. Evaluation of Emergency Potential 
Prior to development of an emergency action plan, consideration must be given to the extent of 
land areas, and types of development with the areas, that would be inundated as a result of dam 
failure or flood, and the time available for emergency response. 
(1) Determination of Mode of Dam Failure. There are many potential causes and modes of dam 
failure, depending upon the type of structure and its foundation characteristics. Similarly, there 
are degrees of "failure" and, often progressive stages of failure. Many dam failures can be 
prevented from reaching a final catastrophic stage by recognition of early indicators or 
precursor conditions, and by prompt, effective emergency actions. While emergency planning 
should emphasize preventive actions, recognition must be given to the catastrophic condition 
and hazard potential. Analysis should be made to determine the most likely mode of dam 
failure under the most adverse condition and the resulting peak water outflow following the 
failure. Where there is a series of dams on the stream, analyses should include consideration of 
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the potential for progressive "domino" failure of the dams. 
(2) Inundation Maps. To evaluate the effects of dam failure, maps should be prepared 
delineating the area which would be inundated in the event of failure. Land uses and significant 
development or improvements within the area of inundation should be indicated. The maps 
should be equivalent to or more detailed than the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
quadrangle maps, 7-1/2 minute series, or of sufficient scale and detail to identify clearly the 
area that should be evacuated if there is evident danger of failure of the dam. Copies of the 
maps should be distributed to local government officials for use in the development of an 
evacuation plan. 
(3) Classification of Inundation Areas. To assist in the evaluation of hazard potential, areas 
delineated on inundation maps should be classified in accordance with the degree of occupancy 
and hazard potential. The potential for loss of life is affected by many factors, including but not 
limited to the capacity and number of exit roads to higher ground and available transportation. 
Hazard potential is greatest in urban areas. Since the extent of inundation is usually difficult to 
delineate precisely because of topographic map limitations, the evaluation of hazard potential 
should be conservative. 
The hazard potential for affected recreation areas varies greatly, depending on the type of 
recreation offered, intensity of use, communication facilities, and available transportation. The 
potential for loss of life may be increased where recreationists are widely scattered over the 
area of potential inundation since they would be difficult to locate on short notice. 
Many industries and utilities requiring substantial quantities of water for one or more stages in 
the manufacture of products or generation of power are located on or near rivers or streams. 
Flooding of these areas and industries can, in addition to causing the potential for loss of life, 
damage to machinery, manufactured products, raw materials and materials in process of 
manufacture, interrupt essential community services. 
Rural areas usually have the least hazard potential. However, the potential for loss of life 
exists, and damage to large areas of intensely cultivated agricultural land can cause high 
economic loss. 
(4) Time Available for Response. Analyses should be made to evaluate the structural, foun 
dation, and other characteristics of the dam and determine those conditions which could be 
expected to result in slow, rapid or practically instantaneous dam failure. 
c. Actions to Prevent Failure or Minimize Effects of Failure 
(1) Development of Emergency Action Plan. An emergency action plan should be developed 
for each dam that constitutes a hazard to life and property, incorporating preplanned 
emergency measures to be taken prior to and following assumed dam failure. The plan should 
be coordinated with local governmental and other authorities involved in public safety and be 
approved by appropriate top level agency or owner management. To the extent possible, the 
emergency action plan should define emergency situations that require immediate notification 
of local officials. The emergency action plan should include notification plans, which are 
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discussed in section (2) below. 
Emergency scenarios should be prepared for possible modes of failure for each dam. 
Periodically these scenarios should be used to test the readiness capabilities of project staff and 
logistics. 
A procedure should be established for review and revision, as necessary, of the emergency 
action plan, including notification plans and evacuation plans, at least once every 2 years. Such 
reviews should be coordinated among all organizations responsible for preparation and 
execution of the plans. 
(2) Notification Plans. Plans for notification of key personnel and the public are an integral part 
of the emergency action plan and should be prepared for slowly developing, rapidly 
developing, and instantaneous dam failure conditions. Notification plans should include a list 
of names and position titles, addresses, office and home telephone numbers, and radio 
communication frequencies and call signals, if available, for agency or owner personnel, public 
officials, and other personnel and alternates who should be notified as soon as emergency 
situations develop. A procedure should be developed to keep the list current. 
Each type of notification plan should contain the order in which key agency or owner 
supervisory personnel or alternates should be notified. At least one key supervisory level or job 
position should be designated to be manned or the responsible person should be immediately 
available by telephone or radio 24 hours a day. A copy of each notification plan must be posted 
in a prominent place at the project site near a telephone and/or radio transmitter. All project 
personnel should be familiar with the plans and the procedures each is to follow in the event of 
an emergency. Copies of the notification plans should be readily available at the home and the 
office of each person involved. 
Where dams located upstream from the dam for which the plan is being prepared could be 
operated to reduce inflow or where the operation of downstream dams would be affected by 
failure of the dam, operators of those dams should be kept informed of the current and 
expected conditions of the dam as the information becomes available. 
Civil defense officials having jurisdiction over all or part of the area subject to inundation 
should receive early notification. Local law enforcement officials and, when possible, local 
government officials and public safety officials should receive early notification. 
The capabilities of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency's National Warning System 
(NAWAS) should be determined for the project and utilized as appropriate. Information can be 
obtained from State or local civil defense organizations. 
Potentially affected industries downstream should be kept informed so that actions to reduce 
risk of life and economic loss can be taken. Coordination with local government and civil 
defense officials would determine responsibility for the notification. Normally, this would be a 
local government responsibility. 
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When it is determined that a dam may be in danger of failing, the public officials responsible 
for the decision to implement the evacuation plan should be kept informed of the developing 
emergency conditions. 
The news media, including radio, television, and newspapers, should be utilized to the extent 
available and appropriate. Notification plans should define emergency situations for which 
each medium will be utilized and should include an example of a news release that would be 
the most effective for each possible emergency. Use of news media should be preplanned 
insofar as is possible by agency and owner personnel and the State and/or local government. 
Information should be written in clear, concise language. Releases to news media should not be 
relied upon as the primary means of notification. 
Notification of recreation users is frequently difficult because the individuals are often alone 
and away from any means of ready communication. Consideration should be given to the use 
of standard emergency warning devices such as sirens at the dam site. Consideration should be 
given to the use of helicopters with bullhorns for areas further downstream. Vehicles equipped 
with public address systems and helicopters with bullhorns are capable of covering large areas 
effectively. 
Telephonic communication should not be solely relied on in critical situations. A backup radio 
communication system should be provided and tested at least once every 3 months. 
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a radio communication system prior to 
the beginning of construction and to the maintenance of the system throughout the life of the 
project. 
(3) Evacuation Plans. Evacuation plans should be prepared and implemented by the local 
jurisdiction controlling inundation areas. This would normally not be the dam agency or 
owner. Evacuation plans should conform to local needs and vary in complexity in accordance 
with the type and degree of occupancy of the potentially affected area. The plans may include 
delineation of area to be evacuated; routes to be used; traffic control measures; shelter, 
methods of providing emergency transportation; special procedures for the evacuation and care 
of people from institutions such as hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons; procedures for 
securing the perimeter and for interior security of the area; procedures for the lifting of the 
evacuation order and reentry to the area; and details indicating which organizations are 
responsible for specific functions and for furnishing the materials, equipment, and personnel 
resources required. 
The assistance of local civil defense personnel, if available, should be requested in preparation 
of the evacuation plan. State and local law enforcement agencies usually will be responsible 
for the execution of much of the plan and should be represented in the planning effort. State 
and local laws and ordinances may require that other State, county, and local government 
agencies have a role in the preparation, review, approval, or execution of the plan. Before 
finalization, a copy of the plan should be furnished to the dam agency or owner for information 
and comment. 
(4) Stockpiling Repair Materials. Suitable construction materials should be stockpiled for 
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should be determined based on the structural, foundation, and other characteristics of the dam; 
design and construction history; and history of prior problems. 
(5) Locating Local Repair Forces. Arrangements should be made with, and a current list 
maintained of, local entities, including contractors, and Federal, State and local construction 
departments, for possible emergency use of equipment and labor. 
(6) Training Operating Personnel. Technically qualified project personnel should be trained in 
problem detection, evaluation, and appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) 
measures. This is essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels of 
responsibility which, initially, must be based on at-site observations. A sufficient number of 
personnel should be trained to assure adequate coverage at all times. If a dam is operated by 
remote control, arrangements must be made for dispatching trained personnel to the project at 
any indication of distress. 
(7) Increasing Inspection Frequency. Frequency of appropriate surveillance activities should be 
increased when the reservoir level exceeds a predetermined elevation. Piezometers, water level 
gauges, and other instruments should be read frequently and on schedule. The project 
structures should be inspected as often as necessary to monitor conditions related to known 
problems and to detect indications of change or new problems that could arise. Hourly or 
continuous surveillance may be mandated in some instances. Any change in conditions should 
be reported promptly to the supervisor for further evaluation. 
The supervisor should issue additional instructions, as necessary, and alert repair crews and 
contractors for necessary repair work if developing conditions indicate that emergency repairs 
or other remedial measures may be required. 
d. Actions Upon Discovery of a Potentially Unsafe Condition 
Action to be taken will depend on the nature of the problem and the time estimated to be 
available for remedial or mitigation measures. As time permits, one or more of the following 
actions will be required. 
(1) Notification of Supervisory Personnel. This is essential, if time permits, since development 
of failure could vary in some or many respects from previous forecasts or assumptions, and 
advice may be needed. 
(2) Initiation of Predetermined Remedial Action. It is imperative that at least one technically 
qualified individual, previously trained in problem detection, evaluation, and remedial action, 
be at the project or on call at all times. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the problem 
and the time available, emergency actions can be initiated, such as lowering the reservoir and 
holding water in upstream reservoirs. Other actions to be taken include notifying appropriate 
highway and traffic control officials promptly of any rim slides or other reservoir embankment 
failures which may endanger public highways. 
(3) Determination of Need for Public Notification. To the extent possible, emergency situations 
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that will require immediate notification of public officials in time to allow evacuation of the 
potentially affected area should be predefined for the use of management and project 
personnel. If sufficient time is available, the decision to notify public officials that the dam can 
be expected to fail will be made at a predetermined supervisory level within the agency or 
owner organization. If failure is imminent or has already occurred, project personnel at the dam 
site would be responsible for direct notification of the public official. The urgency of the 
situation should be made clear so that public officials will take positive action immediately. 
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